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 1 
Abstract 
 
 The decision of the Canadian government in 1970 to recognize the People’s 
Republic of China, which controlled Mainland China, as the official government of 
China, as opposed to the Republic of China, which only controlled Taiwan, was the end 
result of a process lasting more than two decades. In that time frame, Canada’s China 
policy would undergo many different shifts. A close examination shows that these shifts 
were closely linked to the shifting attitudes of successive Canadian leaders. Four different 
prime ministers would serve in office during Canada’s recognition process, and the 
inauguration of each prime minister signaled a shift in Canada’s China policy. The issue 
of recognizing the People’s Republic of China was intertwined with several other issues 
that were important to Canada. Among these were the economic potential of China, 
Canada’s need for collective agreements to ensure its security, the desire of the United 
States to influence Canadian policy, and the desire of Canadian officials to demonstrate 
the independence of Canadian policy. Of the four prime ministers, three – Louis St. 
Laurent, Lester Pearson, and Pierre Trudeau – advocated for opening relations with the 
People’s Republic of China and one – John Diefenbaker – opposed it. Of the recognition 
advocates, St. Laurent and Pearson did little to advance Canada-China relations to any 
noticeable degree while Diefenbaker made some of the greatest advances in Canada-
China relations prior to the recognition of Beijing by the Trudeau government.  All of 
these leaders had publicly advocated specific policies towards Communist China, but 
their actions frequently contradicted their arguments. Ultimately, practical issues drove 
the decisions of these prime ministers, and shifts in policy were the result of the different 
priorities of these leaders regarding the issues they viewed as being most important. 
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Introduction: A Practical Issue 
 
 Canada currently maintains a strong relationship with the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), a connection described by the Canadian government as a “vast and 
dynamic web of cooperative linkages and undertakings” in a range of areas that includes 
health development, governance, culture, education, and trade.1 Ottawa’s economic 
relations with Beijing are particularly well developed.  Canada exported nearly $17 
billion in merchandise to China in 2011, making the PRC Canada’s third-largest export 
destination behind only the United States and the United Kingdom. China also is 
Canada’s second-largest importer behind the United States, with more than $48 billion in 
Chinese goods entering Canada in 2011. 
 The present vitality of Canada’s association with Communist China originated 
with the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1970.  
Before 1970, Canada had struggled to adopt a consistent policy towards China following 
the creation of the PRC in October 1949.  For more than two decades, successive 
Canadian Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments confronted a Cold War 
political and economic embargo of China vigorously championed by the United States.  
Although Canadian politicians and diplomats often shared the anti-Communist outlook of 
their Washington counterparts, the potential to significantly benefit Canada’s economy 
by expanding trade links with Communist China eventually softened Canadian resistance 
to diplomatic recognition of Beijing.  The 1968 election of Pierre Trudeau as Prime 
                                                
1 “Bilateral Relations”, Government of Canada 
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/china-
chine/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/index.aspx?view=d>. Accessed 12 October 2012. 
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Minister, the gradual loosening of the quarantine imposed on China by the United States, 
and mounting pressure to recognize the PRC as the official representative of China in the 
United Nations all coincided to finally allow Canadian and Chinese negotiators to reach 
the crucial 1970 agreement extending reciprocal recognition. 
 This thesis will provide a comprehensive analysis of Canada’s evolving 
relationship with Communist China from the end of the Chinese Civil War until the 
formal establishment of relations between the two countries in 1970.  Practical 
considerations were at the heart of Ottawa’s policy towards Beijing during the period of 
1949-1971.  The Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent largely chose to accommodate 
the United States’ insistence that the West enforce a strict economic and political 
quarantine around the PRC.  Although ideologically predisposed to support Washington’s 
Cold War embargo of China, John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government 
instead chose to expand trade links with Beijing by aggressively soliciting Chinese orders 
for significant quantities of Canadian wheat.  After the Liberal Party returned to power in 
1963, Lester Pearson expanded trade links with China and launched halting attempts to 
integrate China into the United Nations.  Finally, as international opinion continued to 
move away from supporting the efforts of the United States to isolate China, Pierre 
Trudeau quickly pursued the opportunity to successfully cement formal ties with 
Communist China. 
 Despite the importance of the China file in the minds of Ottawa politicians and 
bureaucrats in the first decades of the Cold War, historians have largely failed to provide 
a comprehensive overview of Canada-China relations in this period.  General accounts of 
Canadian foreign policy acknowledge the protracted nature of the recognition debate, but 
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they frequently downplay the importance of growing Sino-Canadian economic and 
diplomatic ties leading to recognition in 1970.  Scholars have provided useful overviews 
of Canadian policy towards China conducted by individual prime ministers, but these 
top-down accounts analyze the approach of successive Canadian governments in 
isolation.  Diplomatic historians have focused on the complex relationship between 
Washington and Ottawa related to the PRC’s recognition, but they usually ignore 
domestic political events affecting Canadian attitudes towards China.  Finally, business 
historians have identified the importance of economic motives in the thawing of 
diplomatic relations between Canada and China in select time periods while ignoring 
political and diplomatic variables involved in the improvement of ties between the two 
countries. 
 Robert Bothwell, perhaps the foremost historian of Canadian foreign affairs, has 
written several general works about Canada’s foreign policy during the Cold War era, but 
these works tend to document the Trudeau initiative to recognize Beijing while ignoring 
the long-term nature of the recognition debate.  In Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the 
World, 1945-1984, for example, Bothwell briefly looks at Canada’s efforts to recognize 
the Communist government of China and acknowledges the importance that Trudeau 
placed on the issue.  However, he is quick to dismiss the value Chinese recognition added 
to Canadian foreign policy, referring to it as “one of the most inconsequential of 
Trudeau’s foreign policy initiatives.” 2 Bothwell’s reasoning is that “recognizing the 
Communist regime in Beijing was simply to come to grips with the facts on the ground: 
                                                
2 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984,  
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 308. 
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China existed and must be dealt with.”3  Bothwell’s statement is true, but at the same 
time, Canadian officials had come to the same conclusion in 1949, and it still took over 
two decades to achieve. Knowing what should be done and being able to do it are two 
very different things. 
 Other historians have provided detailed portraits of various Liberal governments 
and their attitudes towards the recognition of Communist China.  Stephen Beecroft, in his 
article “Canadian Policy towards China, 1949-1957: The Recognition Problem”, 
examines Canada-China relations in the years after the end of the Chinese Civil War. 
Beecroft shows that the Canadian Cabinet had actually decided in November 1949 to 
recognize the Communists as the official government of China, but Prime Minster Louis 
St. Laurent held back because of practical issues.4 For Beecroft, it was the limited 
number of interests in China that resulted in Canada withholding recognition of 
Communist China. Beecroft shows that the United States had begun to harden its stance 
towards Communist China, and with Canada risking so much with the United States, and 
so little with China, St. Laurent decided that holding off on the issue was the best way to 
go for the time being. 
 More attention has been paid to the policies towards China adopted by Lester 
Pearson than those adopted by Louis St. Laurent.  John English, Pearson’s noted 
biographer, describes Pearson’s efforts as being “marked by caution.”5 English identifies 
                                                
3 Ibid., 311. 
4 Stephen Beecroft, “Canadian Policy towards China, 1949-1957: The Recognition 
Problem,” In Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-
1970, edited by Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1991), 53. 
5 John English, “Lester Pearson and China”, In Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the 
People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970, 144. 
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the reason for Pearson’s cautious approach as being his belief that undermining Canada’s 
relationship with the United States was not worth the potential gain that would result 
from opening relations with Communist China. Other historians share English’s 
evaluation of Pearson’s cautious diplomacy. In “Sino-Canadian Relations, 1963-1968: 
The American Factor”, Norman St. Amour argues that when dealing with the issue of 
seating Communist China in the United Nations, Pearson was focused on the idea of 
helping to further Canadian security by strengthening the United Nations. St. Amour 
identifies two main objectives that Pearson had when attempting to seat the Communists. 
The first was that Pearson was aware that without the Chinese government’s participation 
in the United Nations it would be impossible to make any headway on issues like 
disarmament, nuclear proliferation, and the continuing crisis in Vietnam. 6 Opposing this 
was the desire of Pearson to make sure that the United States did not suffer an actual 
defeat in the United Nations, fearing that would cause the United States to withdraw from 
the organization, which would be devastating for Canada and the United Nations. English 
and St. Amour ultimately agree that Pearson saw the practical value of having 
Communist China as part of the United Nations, but they argue that he was limited by the 
reality that seating Communist China during his time in office would have caused 
problems for the United States. The potential gain, therefore, was not worth the risk.  
 Most academic attention has been paid to the efforts of Pierre Trudeau to establish 
diplomatic relations with China.  In “Chinese Shadows”, Fred Edwards argues that by 
recognizing China, Trudeau hoped to make Canadian foreign policy “more independent, 
                                                
6 Norman St Amour, “Sino-Canadian Relation, 1963-1968: The American factor”, In 
Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970, 123. 
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more truly global, less Atlanticist.”7  Trudeau may have had a personal interest in China, 
Edwards argues, but it was practical issues that drove him forward.  In his analysis of 
Trudeau’s China initiative, political scientist B. Michael Frolic adopts a more negative 
tone in his analysis of Trudeau’s decision to recognize China.  Specifically, Frolic makes 
the assertion that Trudeau and other government officials were so focused on opening 
relations with the Communist government that it caused them to quickly bow to pressure 
from the Communists.8 In Frolic’s opinion, Canada acted too quickly and should have 
held out longer for a deal that would have required Canada to make fewer concessions 
regarding the Taiwan government, as the United States and Japan were able to do, after 
Canada’s recognition. Despite the critical attitude that Frolic displays towards the efforts 
of Canadian officials to recognize the Communist government of China, he does 
acknowledge that “at the time it stood out as a Canadian success story by any standard, 
and it deserves to be recorded in history in those terms.”9  
 Many of these studies examining the policies adopted by Liberal governments 
mention in passing the influence of the United States in shaping Canadian policies.  But 
the intense diplomatic struggle between officials in Ottawa and Washington over the 
recognition of China is described most effectively and comprehensively by Angela 
Graham in her unpublished doctoral dissertation “’A Colossus and a Conundrum’: 
Canada, the United States, and Canadian China Policy, 1942-1970”.  Graham 
characterizes Washington’s influence as “the most important and inescapable factor in 
                                                
7 Fred Edwards, “Chinese Shadows”, In Canada Among Nations 2008: 100 Years of 
Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009): 302. 
8 B. Michael Frolic, “The Trudeau Initiative”, In Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the 
People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970, 210-211. 
9 Ibid., 210. 
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Canadian China policy”,10 and she extensively mines archival sources in the United 
States to buttress her arguments.  Ultimately, Graham concludes, Canadian governments 
largely bowed to the will of successive administrations in Washington, and Trudeau’s 
decision to recognize Beijing was simply a foreshadowing of Richard Nixon’s diplomatic 
approach to Communist China in the early 1970s. 
 The final strand of scholarship documenting Canada-China relations in the early 
Cold War focuses on the cementing of economic ties between Ottawa and Beijing.  Here, 
the efforts of John Diefenbaker’s government between 1957 and 1963 to sell significant 
quantities of wheat to China take centre stage.  In “The Limits of Alliance: Cold War 
Solidarity and Canadian Wheat Exports to China, 1950-1963”, historians Greg Donaghy 
and Michael D. Stevenson demonstrate that “a narrowly defined national interest easily 
trumped the ideological pressures of western unity.”11  These authors identify the primary 
reason that Diefenbaker was interested in opening trade with Communist China – the 
United States had begun to give away large amount of wheat, which in turn displaced 
Canada from its usual markets for selling wheat. Donaghy and Stevenson explain that the 
actions of the United States forced Diefenbaker to find new markets to make up for those 
that Canada had lost, and they identify the practical issue of expanding Canadian trade as 
the driving factor for Diefenbaker to make some of the largest advancements in Canada-
China relations that had been achieved before he left office in 1963. 
                                                
10 Angela Graham, “A Colossus and a Conundrum: Canada, the United States, and 
Canadian China Policy, 1942-1970” (PhD thesis: McMaster University, 2007): 16. 
11 Greg Donaghy and Michael D. Stevenson, “The Limits of Alliance: Cold War 
Solidarity and Canadian Wheat Exports to China, 1950-1963”, Agricultural History 83 
no. 1 (Winter, 2009): 29. 
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 This thesis will provide a comprehensive overview of Canada’s policy towards 
China leading to the recognition of Beijing in 1970 by focusing on the policies adopted 
by the St. Laurent, Diefenbaker, Pearson, and Trudeau governments. The first chapter 
will provide background information about Canada’s interactions with China before the 
end of World War II, the Chinese Civil War and the resulting tension between the new 
Communist government of China and the Western World under the leadership of the 
United States. It will also examine the efforts of Prime Minister St. Laurent to open 
relations with Communist China for the practical purposes of Canadian security and 
economic benefits. The chapter will highlight how St. Laurent wanted to open relations, 
but was unable to do so without sacrificing much more than Canada would gain.  
 The second chapter will examine the time of Prime Minister Diefenbaker in office 
from 1957 to 1963, looking at how he resisted calls to recognize the Communist 
government of China, but, at the same time, worked to open trade relations with the 
government. The chapter will show that Diefenbaker’s primary focus was on expanding 
the economy of Canada through trade with foreign nations. It was because of this that he 
focused his attention on expanding trade with Communist China, while at the same time 
resisting calls to formalize relations with Communist China as a means of protecting 
Canadian trade relations with the United States.  
 The third chapter will examine Prime Minister Pearson’s term in office from 1963 
to 1968, and it will discuss how he sought to expand on the trade deals that Diefenbaker 
had started as well as explore several different avenues to attempt to recognize the 
Communist government of China. The chapter will highlight how Pearson made several 
attempts to expand trade and recognize the Communist government, but while he was 
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successful in achieving expanded trade, he was unable to achieve recognition. Though 
several factors were working against his efforts to open official relations between Canada 
and China, Pearson never truly embraced the idea, primarily because he was interested in 
ensuring the survival of the United Nations, which would require the United States 
remaining a part of that organization. Pearson failed to make an all out effort because he 
viewed Canadian security as being related to the maintaining of good relations between 
Canada and the United States, and he was unwilling to push too hard against the status 
quo that had been in place when he came into office.  
 The final chapter will deal with Prime Minister Trudeau’s first term in office from 
1968 to 1971. It will examine the efforts made on Trudeau’s part to recognize the 
Communist government of China as the official government of China and see it seated in 
the United Nations. It will include a description of the negotiations that took place 
between Canada and China, as well as Canada’s efforts to seat the Communists in the 
United Nations. The purpose of the chapter will be to show that Trudeau’s reason for 
wanting to open relations between Canada and China was not based on his ideological 
beliefs, but on the practical issues that Canada was facing. 
 By building on the works of previous historians and the examination of primary 
documents, it will become clear that while the various Prime Ministers no doubt had their 
own beliefs about Communist China, they were not the motivating factor. The practical 
issues that the Prime Ministers faced needed to be addressed, and the reasoning they used 
regarding what took priority was what truly determined the development of Canada’s 
China policy. 
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Chapter One  
The Beginning of the Recognition Process:  
Sino-Canadian Relations to 1957 
 
 Since Canada first began to develop its own foreign policy, successive 
governments in Ottawa had an eye on China for the potential that it represented.  Since 
Canadian foreign policy aims were limited before the end of World War II, however, 
nothing substantial became of this interest. It would not be until the end of the Chinese 
Civil War and the establishment of a Chinese Communist government that Canadian 
officials began to give serious thought to developing Canada’s China policy. Once the 
Communist government was established in 1949, Canadian officials examined the issue 
of diplomatic recognition several times, but Ottawa would always back down when 
meeting resistance from the United States. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent would 
ultimately be unwilling to push back against this pressure because doing so would work 
against the primary concern that he was working to address – increasing Canadian 
security by building relations with more powerful nations like the United States.   
Canada’s Involvement in China before 1949 
 When Canada first began to open relations with other countries, the government 
sought out opportunities of national benefit; as a result, Canada did not put any real effort 
into establishing relations with China until World War II. Canada’s lack of presence in 
China can be attributed to a number of reasons, the main reason being that Canada could 
not practically assert its presence in the Pacific before the Second World War. The reality 
at the time was that while “Canadians hoped for peace in the Pacific, few considered it an 
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objective they could influence”.12  Canada did not have the military and economic means 
to project influence on the opinions or actions of other nations, nor even the diplomatic 
capabilities to carry out such actions if it had wanted to. Canada’s limitations caused 
Canadian officials to ignore areas like Asia in favour of more traditionally friendly 
powers like the United States and some European nations.  The only exception to 
Canada’s policy was Japan, where Canada opened its third overseas legation in Tokyo in 
1929.  In 1939, the highest Canadian government official present in China was the Trade 
Commissioner, M. T. Stewart, and the government had estimated, as no official records 
existed, that there were only 75 or 100 Canadians present in Shanghai,13 the most 
important Chinese treaty port that had “one of the greatest concentrations of Canadians 
abroad.”14 That the Canadian presence in Shanghai was so small highlights that the 
Canadian government may have had interest in China, but there did not appear to be any 
strong motivator to increase Canada-China relations from the point of view of the 
Canadian government. 
 With no practical opportunity or real desire to assert itself in the Pacific, the 
Canadian government simply allowed missionaries from different parts of Canada to take 
the lead in building relations with the Chinese government and people.  According to 
historian Peter M. Mitchell, “From the late 1880s through much of the early twentieth 
century, the Canadian missionary community in China was Canada’s most organized 
                                                
12 Peter M. Mitchell, “The Missionary Connection”, In Reluctant Adversaries: Canada 
and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970, 19. 
13 “The Shanghai Situation”, In Documents on Canadian External Relations 1939-1941, 
Part II, Volume 8, ed. David R. Murray (Ottawa: Printing and Publishing Supply and 
Services Canada, 1976), 1128. 
14 John Meehan, Chasing the Dragon in Shanghai: Canada’s Early Relations with China, 
1858-1952 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 7. 
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overseas presence, with the exception of wartime military expeditions.”15  The majority 
of Canadian missionaries were Protestant, with Presbyterian, Methodist, and Anglican 
organizations actively recruiting in Canada for Chinese service; Canadian Catholics also 
had a strong presence in China.16  Missionaries provided much of the information that 
ordinary Canadian citizens learned about the situation in China, thus influencing public 
opinion in Canada regarding foreign affairs. Missionaries often wrote letters home, 
detailing their experiences and opinions while in China, and they were read during 
weekly church services, an activity at that time in which the whole family took part, 
causing people to learn about China and develop opinions about the country based on the 
missionaries’ writings.17  
 It was also during the last decades of the nineteenth century that the issue of 
immigration first began to take on a degree of importance that endured to the second half 
of the twentieth century. Many people want to immigrant to countries or locations where 
jobs are present and workers are in demand. Canada was one such nation after 1860 as a 
result of the gold rush and railroad boom, which attracted approximately twenty thousand 
Chinese labourers to Canada seeking employment.18 The huge increase in foreigners 
settling in Canada worried the Canadian government, especially when it considered what 
would occur after the demand for workers decreased. The end result was the creation of 
the Chinese Immigration Act in 1885, which was designed specifically to stem the flow 
                                                
15 Mitchell, “The Missionary Connection”, 17. 
16 Meehan, Chasing the Dragon in Shanghai, 18. 
17 Mitchell, “The Missionary Connection”, 20-21. 
18 Meehan, Chasing the Dragon in Shanghai, 24. 
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of Chinese immigrants into Canada by placing a head tax on them, originally set at $50 
but increased two more times until it became $500 in 1904.19  
 The Chinese Immigration Act proved to be a point of contention between the 
Canadian and Chinese governments from the moment it was enacted, due mainly to the 
fact that neither side could agree on a replacement idea that would address the concerns 
of the other. The main problem from the point of view of Canada was that “the difference 
in the standard of living between Orientals and the people of the North American 
continent formed an important element in the competition of the labouring classes” 
forcing the government of Canada to take action to address the problem.20 The only other 
option to handling the immigration problem was to have China enact a policy that would 
reduce the emigration of its population to Canada. Canada had already made deals of this 
sort with other Asian nations such as India and Japan; however, the Chinese government 
was either unable or unwilling to enact a similar policy, resulting in the Canadian 
government keeping the Chinese Immigration Act in place.21 
 It was during the Second World War that official diplomatic relations between 
Canada and the Republic of China (ROC) began to take the first major steps forward. On 
31 July 1941, the Canadian Cabinet, led by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie 
King, approved the opening of a legation in Chungking, the capital of unoccupied China 
during the time.22  The person chosen to become the Chinese Minister to Canada was Dr. 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 “Minister in China to Foreign Secretary,” In Documents on Canadian External 
Relations, Volume 1, 1909-1918, ed. Roger Duhamel (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and 
Controller, 1967), 598. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Kim Richard Nossal, “Business as Usual: Canadian Relations with China in the 
1940’s”, Historical Papers 13, no. 1 (1978), 135. 
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Liu Shih-shun. His appointment was made official and finalized by February 1942.23 
China moved quickly to establish a diplomatic presence in Canada, but the same was not 
true in reverse. Canada delayed for a variety of reasons, including “Canadian lassitude 
and partly because of the difficulty of finding a suitable candidate.”24 Eventually, Major 
General Victor Wentworth Odlum was selected to fill the post, arriving in Chungking to 
establish the first Canadian diplomatic presence in China in early 1943. With the 
establishment of official diplomatic relations between the countries, Canada and China 
became official allies in the war against the Axis powers, and consideration was given to 
the best means available to support Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion and 
occupation of China.25  
 During the Second World War, Canada contributed greatly to the war in Europe, 
but it contributed very little to the war in the Pacific due to the limitations of Canada’s 
capabilities given the state of Canada, the situation in the Pacific, and the desires of other 
nations to limit Canada’s influence in Asia. Despite the limitations it faced, Canada did 
attempt to make some contributions to resisting the Japanese in the Pacific. Canada’s 
contributions came mainly in the form of providing supplies to the Chinese forces 
resisting the Japanese, but even this proved difficult for a variety of reasons.  To aid the 
Chinese in their attempts to fight Japanese forces, the government added China to the list 
of countries that would receive assistance from the Canadian Mutual Aid program, which 
was overseen by the Canadian Mutual Aid Board (CMAB), composed of various 
                                                
23 Angela Graham, “A Colossus and a Conundrum”, 34. 
24 Nossal, “Business as Usual”, 135. 
25 Ibid., 136. 
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Canadian ministers.26 The Canadian Mutual Aid program was “a military assistance 
programme, established in 1943, and designed primarily to help the British war effort.”27  
 Although providing aid to the Chinese government was in the best interests of 
defeating Japan, other nations were already looking at what would happen after the war. 
The United States was one such nation. It began to pursue policies that it felt would be in 
its best interests for a post-war world. In a 1943 telegram to the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Victor Odlum wrote: “Even Canadian Red Cross in China has been told 
that it has no right to bring in supplies from Canada when the United States is ready to 
provide everything that can be carried by available transport.”28 Odlum’s statement 
clearly indicated a desire on the part of the United States to establish a commanding 
presence in post-war China by intentionally making China dependent on the United 
States. Therefore, the United States would have to limit the influence of other foreign 
powers from Chinese politics. Additionally, Canada lacked any practical means to get the 
supplies that it had set aside to China. The Japanese had occupied China’s shipping ports 
and patrolled the waters in the Pacific Ocean, making shipping between Canada and 
China impossible.29 The only route left open that could be used to provide supplies to the 
Chinese was by air through the mountains dividing India and China; however, air 
shipping was under the control of the United States military, resulting in very little 
Canadian aid reaching China before the end of the war.30  
                                                
26 Ibid., 137. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Minister in China to Secretary of State for External Affairs, In Documents on 
Canadian External Relations, Volume 9, 1942-1943, ed. John F. Hilliker (Hull: Canadian 
Government Publishing Centre Supply and Services Canada, 1980), 413-414. 
29 Graham, “A Colossus and a Conundrum”, 44. 
30 Ibid. 
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 Despite the fact that Canada was slow in providing practical aid, both in terms of 
supplies and weapons, and political aid, in the form of appointing a minister to China, 
many Canadian officials still sought to increase friendly ties with China, knowing the 
potential that China would have after the war. According to Kim Richard Nossal, the 
reason that Canada was so willing to help China, despite the lack of interest shown by 
other allied governments, was “the lure of increased trade with China after the war.”31 
His theory is supported in much of the official government documents concerning China 
that were circulating at the time. In a letter to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Mines 
and Resources, T.A. Crerar, stated that “When the war is over … China will be one of the 
countries where great developments take place, in the material sense … it will be worth 
much to Canada to have good will in that country.”32 The idea of taking actions that 
would help to increase the possibility of trade with China is something that was continued 
by the Canadian government after the end of World War II and into the Chinese Civil 
War, when fighting between Nationalist Chinese forces and Communist Chinese forces 
resumed. 
 After the end of the war, nations like the United States and Britain wanted to 
ensure the survival or creation of governments friendly to their goals and policies. 
Canada, on the other hand, had no real interest in the creation of governments, and 
focused its attention on building trade relations that were beneficial to the Canadian 
economy, as well as maintaining friendly diplomatic relations with a nation, regardless of 
its affiliations. Though Canada’s goals were simple in nature, they were greatly 
                                                
31 Nossal, “Business as Usual”, 137. 
32 Minister Mines and Resources to Prime Minister, In Documents on Canadian External 
Relations, Volume 9, 1942-1943, 1793. 
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complicated by the fact that the Canadian government chose to follow the lead of other 
nations, specifically that of the United States and Britain, when implementing or 
maintaining its foreign policies. The result was a delicate balancing act between Canada’s 
economic and foreign policy interests and the opinions of the United States and Britain 
with regards to events unfolding in China. It was for these reasons that Canada chose to 
maintain a neutral position (or least the pretenses of a neutral position) with regard to the 
fighting between the Nationalist Chinese and Communist Chinese forces.  
 Though Canada’s position as a weaker nation than the United States or Britain 
caused problems when attempting to conduct agreements with the Chinese government 
on a number of issues, it also had a beneficial nature that Canada was aware of after 
World War II. In 1947, T.C. Davis, who had replaced Odlum as Canada’s highest 
diplomat in China, informed Ottawa that the Chinese government and people viewed 
Canada in a positive light when compared to the United States and Britain. After meeting 
with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Davis reported that the Chinese 
Minister felt that the United States and Britain may have had ulterior motives when 
dealing with China, given their positions as great powers economically and militarily. 33 
Davis essentially reported on a fear in the Chinese government of imperial powers 
attempting to encroach on China, as had been done in the past.  The situation with 
Canada was different, because China “realized that while we were a powerful nation 
                                                
33 Ambassador in China to Secretary of State for External Affairs, In Documents on 
Canadian External Relations, Volume 13, 1947, ed. Norman Hillmer (Ottawa: Canada 
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economically, from the military standpoint we were not a great power, and that therefore 
they had felt freer in relation to Canada than they had to the other powers.”34 
 Despite the fact that the atmosphere in China was friendly to Canada, it did not 
play any decisive role in Canadian politics, with the government focused more on 
practical issues of immediate concern. Canada sought to maintain and increase Chinese 
goodwill by providing the ROC with aid for reconstruction.  In 1946, Canada increased 
its credit loan to China to $60 million that would be divided into two categories of $25 
million and $35 million.35 The first category was to be used for the “purchase of supplies 
and equipment which had been requested by China from Canada as Mutual Aid.”36 The 
second category would be “available for purchasing equipment, supplies and services 
desired by the Government of China in Canada for reconstruction and other post-war 
purposes.”37 The aid Canada offered did not include military arms, in keeping with the 
policies of the United States and Britain, who had imposed an arms embargo against 
China in August 1946.38 Canada’s decision to follow the lead of Britain and the United 
States gave great power to the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) and its 
continued arguments against getting involved in the Chinese Civil War. The Canadian 
Cabinet later agreed in a meeting on 16 April 1947 to “maintain a complete embargo on 
all exports of arms to China.”39 Nonetheless, Canadian politicians were still open to the 
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idea of pursuing deals that benefited Canada. After the arms embargo was put into effect, 
the ROC requested the purchase of 174 Mosquito fighter-bombers, and several other 
pieces of weaponry and ammunition, that was meant to equip and arm the aircraft being 
purchased.40 In trying to justify the potential sale to British officials, Canadian officials 
indicated that: 
 This proposed sale does not reflect any change in Canadian policy, but should be 
 regarded as an exception to our general embargo on the shipment of arms and 
 ammunition in China, which was accepted principally because it involves some 
 6,000,000 U.S. dollars for Canada.41 
 
The desire of Canadian officials to sell weaponry to the Chinese government, even 
though it was fighting a civil war, is perhaps the best example, prior to the establishment 
of a Communist government in China, of Canada setting aside its ideals in order to see a 
more practical issue be resolved. 
 Though the ROC received aid from other countries, it could not make up for other 
deficiencies. The main problem was the ineffective leadership of the ROC leader, Chiang 
Kai-shek, who often relied more on foreign aid to win the war as opposed to his own 
skills. In a report to the Canadian government, T.C. Davis blasted Chiang for “his 
inability to delegate authority and his tendency to choose leaders for their loyalty to him 
rather than for their talents.”42 Davis reported that Chiang and those in his government 
that supported him were “counting on more American aid” in order to turn the tide of the 
war in their favour, and that the Nationalists were losing ground not because of a 
“shortage of soldiers or equipment, but through a lack of proper command and a loss of 
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morale.”43 The situation in China continued to deteriorate for the Nationalists, until defeat 
seemed all but inevitable. As a result, Canada began to distance itself from the ROC, and 
began to discuss options for maintaining good relations with Communist China should 
that side prevail in the Chinese Civil War. 
The Question of Recognizing Communist China, 1949-1957  
 By 1949 the situation in China for the Nationalists had begun to deteriorate to the 
point that the Western powers contemplated what would happen if the Communists won 
the war. A steady stream of reports authored by Western officials in China described the 
continual setbacks the Nationalists suffered and the advances made by the Communists 
forces. In Ottawa, H.O. Moran informed Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester 
Pearson that “the military position of the Nationalist Government of China continues to 
deteriorate rapidly.”44 Moran described the large number of casualties suffered by 
Nationalist troops, the fall of one of the last major government bastions in Mainland 
China located one hundred miles North of Nanking, the Nationalist capital, as well as his 
doubts about the Nationalist forces’ ability to hold their newly formed defensive line, in 
addition to the declining morale of the Nationalists, something that he considered to be 
“one of the key factors” in the conflict.45  Just over three months after Moran’s 
depressing account of the Nationalist situation, the Communists captured Nanking after 
the government abandoned the city.46 At the same time, the Communists were also 
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moving in an attempt to cut off three hundred thousand Nationalist troops, who were in 
Shanghai, from escaping south towards areas that were still in Nationalist hands.47 
 As a result of the fall of Nanking, many Western governments began to consider 
whether or not they should recognize the Communists as the official government of 
China, once they met the prerequisites necessary for being an official government. The 
issue was much simpler at the time because many governments believed that the ROC 
would, if not conquered by the Communist forces, fall apart given the hopelessness of 
their situation and the incompetence of the Nationalist leadership under Chiang Kai-shek. 
In June 1949, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, A.D.P. Heeney, informed 
Pearson that “It is very doubtful whether the Nationalist government can maintain itself 
as an entity in South China.”48 Given Heeney’s conclusion that there was little chance the 
Nationalist government would survive, leaving the Communists as the sole governmental 
authority in China, the issue of recognition of the Communists was forced on the 
Canadian government.  
 After the Nationalists had lost their capital at Nanking, several ambassadors who 
were still in the city were told to remain in the city for a variety of reasons. The Canadian 
ambassador was told to stay put because Ottawa believed that would be the best way to 
safeguard the “interests and welfare of Canadians in China.”49  Despite leaving the 
ambassador in Nanking, however, Canadian officials noted that “a national capital which 
has been captured by insurgent forces, does not, by the tenets of international law, 
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constitute recognition of the new authorities as being the proper government of China.”50  
Even if the Canadian government had wanted to recognize the Communists, it would not 
have been possible to do so, in A.D.P. Heeney’s view, until “the Communists have 
established some form of central government.”51 Although Western governments such as 
Canada were neither willing nor able to recognize the Communists as the leaders of 
China at that point, they did begin to take steps that signaled their willingness to open 
lines of communication with the Communists. Having their ambassadors remain in 
Nanking, in Heeney’s opinion, gave “prestige to the Communists while emphasizing the 
lack of confidence felt in the Nationalist government.”52  
 On 1 October 1949, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was established in Peking with Mao Zedong as President and Chou En-lai as 
Premier and Foreign Minister. With the creation of a new central government in China, 
the idea of recognition took on a more immediate and serious tone. It also had the effect 
of creating new problems for the Canadian DEA. The creation of the PRC caused 
Canada’s allies to become divided over the issue of recognizing the new government, 
with some nations advocating recognition and others wanting to put the issue off for as 
long as possible, with Canada caught in the middle.  The nations whose opinions were of 
greatest interest to Canada were the United States and Britain. Canada was interested in 
their opinions because Canada had a long history of following the lead of Britain and the 
United States had become Canada’s most important economic trading partner. Each 
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nation had a set of priorities quite different from one another, which dictated how they 
responded to the creation of a centralized Communist government in China.  
 The reasoning behind the United States’ approach was that by refusing to 
recognize the Communist regime in China, the PRC would be forced to look to the Soviet 
Union for the critical economic aid needed to repair the country from the civil war.53 In 
forcing the Soviet Union to look after the PRC, the United States believed that relations 
between the Soviet Union and China would become strained, as well as putting more 
pressure on the Communists to control the people of China, possibly to the point that 
their hold would break. The British approach to the situation was the opposite of the 
American policy. The British favoured a “foot in the door” policy that held that “an 
official western presence in China could possibly counteract Soviet influences and 
exploit cracks in the relations between the USSR and China.”54  
 Though there were many reasons why the United States and Britain came to 
support such different policies to achieve the same goal, one of the main reasons was the 
different level of economic value that the two nations placed on China. Britain had a long 
history of economic relations with China, and, thus, had much more capital and business 
holdings invested in the country. The United States had some economic investments in 
China, but not nearly as much as Britain. Britain sought to protect its economic interests 
by supporting a policy that would not cut off all contact between the Western world and 
China, while the United States had far less to lose in China and sought to destroy the 
Communist regime by crippling the Chinese economy.  
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 Canada eventually sided with Britain’s “foot in the door” policy because 
Canada’s foreign policy planners disagreed with the reasoning behind the United States’ 
approach to China and found Britain’s policy to be sound theoretically. Despite Canada 
having decided to side with Britain, it held back for number of reasons. Canada had less 
economic interest in China then either the United States or Britain, removing any 
incentive for Canada to move quickly in establishing friendly relations with China. At the 
same time, Canada, had comprehensive economic ties with the United States which were 
critical to the welfare of the Canadian economy, giving influence to those who sought to 
delay recognition of the PRC in order not to upset relations between Canada and the 
United States. A.D.P. Heeney summed up the Canadian position toward the PRC by 
noting that “Canadian interests in China are not extensive. It would not be appropriate 
therefore, for Canada to take the initiative with regard to relations with Communist 
China.”55  
 The issue of recognition was the primary concern of Canadian officials when 
examining Canada’s China policy, but it was not the only issue that they considered. The 
PRC controlled Mainland China and for all practical purposes had become the 
government of China, but the ROC still existed and also claimed that title. Any action 
that Canada took in favour of the PRC could also be viewed as an action against the 
ROC, and Canada still had some interest in the continuing friendship of the ROC 
government. The ROC still existed on the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and Canadian 
officials feared that the ROC would not honour the loan Canada had provided to it during 
the Chinese Civil War. The issue of repayment became irrelevant when, in 1950, the 
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ROC defaulted on the remaining portion – fifty million dollars – of the sixty million 
dollar loan and interest plan that Canada had given it in 1945.56 The only remaining 
option for the Canadian government to try and reclaim some portion of the loan was to 
attempt to negotiate with the PRC to have them repay part of the non-military portion of 
the loan, which would not happen while the Canadian government did not recognize the 
PRC’s claim to be the official government of China. Arguments that supported 
recognition were tempered, however, by fear of disapproval not only by foreign 
governments but also the Canadian public.  One of the primary worries that politicians 
had while discussing the issue of conferring Canadian recognition on the PRC was the 
way that the Canadian public would interpret the action. Lester B. Pearson, Canada’s 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, wrote to Cabinet stating that there was a distinct 
possibility that “sections of Canadian public opinion might regard recognition of the 
Chinese Communist regime as signifying approval.”57  
 By the time that the Chinese Civil War had ended, Louis St. Laurent had replaced 
Mackenzie King as the new prime minister of Canada. With the establishment of the PRC 
and the default of the ROC, it became highly desirable for Canada to open relations with 
the Communist government in order to try and salvage some of Canada’s investments, 
both economic and goodwill, in China. Prime Minister St. Laurent most likely saw the 
benefits that would come with recognizing the PRC as the official government of China, 
but the practical realities of the situation would prove to be a firm deterrent. Facing 
pressure from members of his own government, important allies like the United States, 
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and possibly members of the Canadian public, St. Laurent’s opinion on what was right 
was meaningless against the combined weight of those who opposed recognition. 
 In November 1949, the Canadian Cabinet approved the idea of extending 
recognition to the PRC in principle, but deferred the decision of when the actual action of 
recognition might take place.58 By approving the idea but delaying the action, the 
Canadian government was able to address the reality of the situation in China without 
offending its allies or citizens. The idea of postponing the decision of when to recognize 
the PRC was one that the Canadian government would continue to follow with the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.  The Korean War changed things by 
sharpening the attitudes of many western governments. The Canadian public opposed the 
spread of communism to the point that any action taken that did not challenge 
communism was seen as supporting communism. With the mood of the Canadian public 
as it was, the Canadian government could not afford to proceed with its plans to 
recognize the PRC without severe domestic and foreign repercussions.  Heeney informed 
Pearson in July 1950 that it would be necessary to delay the question of officially 
recognizing the PRC until the “immediate crisis in Korea is over” or “Communist 
China’s attitude towards the Korean action becomes clearer.”59 The delaying of 
recognition was extended even further once Canadian troops, as part of the United 
Nations force, began fighting Chinese troops in the Korean War. 
 Canada’s refusal to recognize the PRC also played out in the United Nations, 
where annual debates occurred about who was the lawful holder of the Chinese seat.  
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While it was true that the PRC did not control Taiwan, it was equally true that there was 
no chance that the ROC would be able to defeat the PRC and regain control of the 
Chinese Mainland. The basic problem that resulted in the challenges to recognizing an 
official government of China was that there were two governments that both claimed to 
be the official government of China and it appeared that neither government would 
disappear in the near future. With the Korean War still being waged between Communist 
and United Nations forces, the issue of recognition of the PRC was dealt a severe blow. 
While the idea of recognizing the PRC was losing momentum due to the increasing 
tension between Communist and non-Communist governments, the issue of Chinese 
representation in the United Nations took on a more immediate and important tone. 
 Canada had traditionally supported the ROC’s claim to the United Nations seat, 
and Heeney advised Pearson in June 1951 that Canada should not alter its policy on 
“voting on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations” even if the 
government did decide to eventually change its policy about recognizing the Nationalist 
government as being the legitimate government of China.60  Heeney’s advice continued 
to be the official Canadian position even after the Korean War ended.  In the instructions 
for the Canadian delegation to the 8th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA), occurring in 1953, Pearson instructed the delegation that any proposal that 
would “admit Communist China to the United Nations should be opposed.” 61 Though 
Canada did not play any sort of decisive part in this session of the UNGA, the issue was 
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once again taken up in 1954. At the 9th meeting of the UNGA Pearson instructed the 
Canadian delegation to postpone the issue, citing “the failure of efforts to reach a final 
peace settlement in Korea in accordance with the principles laid down by the United 
Nations.”62 
 Prime Minister St. Laurent was aware of the benefits that would result from the 
PRC joining the United Nations, but the benefits that would be gained would come with a 
cost. Tensions between East and West had become strained with the outbreak of the 
Korean War, as the United States took the lead in opposing the entrance of the PRC into 
the United Nations with many other countries supporting it. Canada relied on 
international organizations for its security and having the PRC join the United Nations 
would have greatly increased the power of the organization. During the 9th meeting of the 
United Nations the representative of the Soviet Union used the same argument in an 
attempt to seat the PRC. The Soviet representative pointed to the Geneva Conference, 
where the “Chinese People’s Republic had taken its rightful place among the great 
powers”, and noted that the inclusion of the PRC had “done much to relax international 
tensions.”63 
 The argument of the Soviet representative was a good one, but the practical 
realities of the international situation after the Korean War stopped Canada from 
supporting it. Other nations also agreed that with the current tension between the PRC 
and United Nations forces stationed in Korea the time would not be right to consider 
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seating the PRC. The representatives of the United Kingdom, which recognized the PRC 
as the official government of China, and Australia, which did not recognize the PRC, 
both spoke out against seating the PRC in the United Nations during its 9th meeting.64 
 Canada’s China policy did not advance any further in the last years of the 
government of Prime Minister St. Laurent.  When examining the issue of recognition, it 
is important to understand that there are two different types of recognition, according to 
international law, that can be given to a government from a foreign power.  The first type 
of recognition is de facto recognition that does little more than acknowledges that a 
government has control over a territory.65  The second type of recognition is de jure, 
which is much more difficult to qualify for and has a number of set conditions that must 
be met. In order to be given de jure recognition, a government must have “effective 
control of the national territory, obedience of the bulk of the population and a reasonable 
prospect of permanency.”66 By 1951 the PRC had met all the conditions of being given 
de jure recognition, while the ROC had not, but the Korean War delayed further progress 
on the issue. 
 In March 1954 Prime Minister St. Laurent was attending a press conference in 
Seoul, when he responded to a question by saying that “some day Canada would have to 
be realistic and admit that the government of China was the government its people 
wanted.”67 Immediately after St. Laurent’s statement, the Progressive Conservative 
Opposition in Canada attacked him for it and criticized him by saying that “the people of 
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China really had no chance to express their opinions on the form of government they 
wanted.”68  The Prime Minister’s comments also resulted in a wave of condemnation 
from ordinary people and organizations that did not have a personal stake in seeing the 
Liberal government suffer.  
 The list of St. Laurent’s critics included the Superior General of the Scarboro 
Foreign Mission Society and the Catholic Women’s League of Canada,69 who expressed 
their public outrage over what they viewed as approval of the Communist regime despite 
what many people viewed as aggression on the part of the Communists. While many 
people spoke out against St. Laurent, some people spoke out in favour of the Prime 
Minister’s comments because they viewed his actions as being done by Canadians and 
being independent of the influences of other nations like the United States. Still, it was 
clear that many Canadians opposed the idea of recognizing the PRC.  With such strong 
opposition at home, and such small support for recognition, it would have been politically 
difficult for Prime Minister St. Laurent to move forward with recognition at that time.  
 Domestic opposition was not the only reason for the Canadian government 
wanting to delay the issue of seating the PRC in the United Nations. It can also be argued 
that Canada wanted to strengthen this international organization. Canada has never been a 
great military power, at least compared to other military powers in the world, so by the 
1950s Canada had come to rely on international organizations such as the United Nations 
for its security. Prime Minister St. Laurent and the Canadian government may have 
wanted to bring the PRC into the United Nations, as they had considered doing before the 
                                                
68 Ibid., 134-135. 
69 Ibid., 135. 
 34 
Korean War, but the practical issues of the United Nations prevented them from voicing 
their approval.  
 St. Laurent was also keenly aware that the United States had staked out a position 
firmly opposed to recognizing the PRC as the official government of China.  At the 
London meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in July 1956, St. Laurent 
informed his colleagues that, in his opinion, there was little that could be done about the 
issue of supporting the PRC.  Although he “recognized the incongruity of having the vast 
majority of Chinese represented by the Nationalist Government,” the Canadian Prime 
Minister noted that the United States had threatened to withdraw from the United Nations 
if the Nationalist government was removed from its seat in New York.70 It was hoped that 
the United States’ attitude “would not persist indefinitely”, but St. Laurent did not 
anticipate any progress being made on the issue until after the 1956 presidential elections 
in the United States. The Liberal Party would eventually leave office in June 1957 
without advancing the issue of recognizing Communist China any further. 
Export Controls on Trade with Communist China, 1949-1957 
 Economic warfare has long been seen as an effective alternative to standard 
military warfare. The problem with economic warfare in the modern world, specifically 
when dealing with a nation like Communist China, is that no one nation can cripple the 
economy of its opponent; rather, it takes the efforts of many nations working together to 
do any real harm. The need for many different nations to work together to wage an 
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effective economic campaign against the PRC was evident at the start of the Korean War 
and would remain so for much of the 1950s.  
 The United States wanted to limit China’s ability to pursue aggressive policies in 
Asia and decided to pursue a policy of economic warfare against China. The United 
States, however, could not wage an effective economic war on its own and needed the 
other nations of the Western world to join with them. Many nations agreed to go along 
with the American plan, but there was a great deal of tension among Western 
governments over how extreme the policy should be. The United States wanted the most 
extreme course of action while other nations, like Britain, wanted a less extreme course. 
The disagreement over economic relations with China made it difficult for the Western 
world to provide a united front against China. Canada was caught in the middle between 
the leaders of the two camps.  Though problems between the United States and Britain 
had occurred in the past, the situation for Canada had changed after the end of the Second 
World War. Canada maintained its traditional ties to Britain and the British 
Commonwealth, but there could be no doubt that the United States was an important 
factor in maintaining the prosperity of the Canadian economy.  
 Canadian officials had long believed that there was economic potential in China 
that Canada could exploit, and with the expansion of Canadian diplomatic and economic 
capabilities that occurred after the end of World War II, many Canadian officials believed 
that the time was right to take advantage of the opportunities that China offered.  In 
September 1949, External Affairs officials in Nanking informed Ottawa that “great 
possibilities for Canadian trade” existed with China, regardless of the government that 
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controlled the country.71 Canada, as a result, should pursue a policy of “ordinary trade on 
a business basis” with Communist China, even if the United States should decide to cut 
off trade with Beijing.72  
 After the fall of the Nationalist government on Mainland China the United States 
began to look at methods that it could employ to limit the capabilities of the Communists 
or cause the collapse of their regime. The United States government saw four different 
methods that it could employ to try and strike a blow against the PRC: cultural, military, 
political, and economic.73 The defeat of the Nationalist government, which had enjoyed 
the military support of the United States, by Communist forces had proven that the 
military option would most likely fail to achieve its goals, except at a cost far greater then 
the United States was willing to pay. Of the remaining options, United States officials 
came to the conclusion that the economic course of action was the one most likely to 
succeed, whether it took the form of “discontinued economic relations – aid, trade, or 
investment – or imposed economic sanctions against China.”74  The policy of using 
economic warfare to help limit the options of a rival was not something new in U.S. 
foreign policy, as Washington had been following a policy of “export control aimed at 
depriving the Soviet Union and its satellites of goods of military strategic importance” 
since 1947.75  
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 China, however, was not the same as the Soviet Union. The United States had, in 
the opinion of several American officials, become an important trading partner to China 
after World War II, and as a result the degree of “American influence” in China had 
become stronger and more valuable in influencing the decisions of the Chinese 
government.76 Wanting to maintain the influence that the United States wielded in China, 
U.S. officials modified their plans from a broad strategy of denying resources to the PRC, 
to a more narrow and refined strategy of isolating China diplomatically and making it 
dependent on the United States.  In order to achieve their new goals, the United States 
sought to drive a wedge between Peking and Moscow, thus resulting in China becoming 
dependent on goods supplied by non-communist countries; however, for the United 
States’ strategy to work, a total embargo of trade between the West and China would 
have to be abandoned. The final product was a strategy that would “restrict trade in 
commodities important to security, while permitting other exchanges,” which would 
allow the United States to utilized both the fear and inducement aspects of economic 
warfare.77 This policy was in place for a very short time before the outbreak of the 
Korean War in June 1950, and the full entrance of Chinese forces into the war against 
United Nations forces during the autumn of that year.  
 The entry of the Chinese into the Korean War hardened attitudes in Washington 
to the point that it instituted a “total economic embargo against the Beijing regime.”78 
President Harry Truman also came to the conclusion that the United States would not be 
able to carry out an embargo against China that had any meaningful effect unless the 
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other Western nations that traded with China were willing to cooperate and impose 
similar embargoes of their own against China.79 While many, but not all, nations agreed 
with the reasoning behind limiting China’s ability to acquire strategic resources, the 
majority of Western nations were hesitant to commit to a total embargo of importing 
goods from or exporting goods to China.  
 Given the importance of the United States in the Canadian economy, Canada 
could not easily dismiss the requests made by the United States to join their efforts to 
isolate China from the rest of the world. Canadian officials were well aware of the 
importance of Canadian trade with the United States; however, in order to preserve this 
trade, Canada would have to adopt similar export controls as the United States, utilizing a 
system that had been created “during the Second World War to ensure that neither 
country became an outlet for the other’s restricted exports.”80 Despite the importance of 
the United States to Canada, the Canadian government remained hesitant about the 
efforts of the United States to isolate China. Many officials believed that the United 
States’ policies might, in fact, force China and the Soviet Union closer together, which 
was the opposite of what the United States, and Canada wanted.81  Canada had 
“restricted the export of military and strategic goods to Mao’s China in 1949”; however, 
the government was not willing to go much further than that prior to the outbreak of the 
Korean War.82 Once China became involved in the war Canada’s support of the policies 
of the United States regarding China became mandatory, with public opinion in the 
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United States, as well as the U.S. Congress, reaching a fevered pitch that would not 
permit any opposing views.  
 During the Korean War, Canada continued its policy against supplying China 
with strategic materials. It did, however, supply China with goods that “were neither 
strategic nor in short supply,” and allowed for the importation of goods that were 
produced in China.83 The United States did not allow for these exceptions; however, it 
did not make a considerable difference, because the Communist regime in China did not 
allow for the import of “goods for ordinary civilian consumption.”84  The issue of 
importing goods from China would remain a sore point between the United States and 
Canada.  The United States prohibited “the landing in the United States of merchandise 
of Chinese or North Korean origin intended for consumption, for immediate exportation, 
or for transportation and exportation.”85 The United States’ policy applied to Chinese-
made products that were shipped to the United States with their final destination being for 
consumption or sale in Canada, thus having a negative effect on the Canadian economy.   
 While there were some disagreements over the export embargo against China 
among Western governments, the fact remained that while there was fighting in Korea, 
no nation was willing to break fully with the United States over the embargo. Once the 
fighting in Korea stopped, however, the situation with the Western governments changed 
drastically and quickly.  No nation was louder or more consistent in its opposition to the 
embargo than Britain. The reason for Britain leading the opposition to maintaining the 
embargo against China was simply that Britain was heavily invested economically in 
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China and Hong Kong. Hong Kong, being a British colony and highly dependent on trade 
with China to maintain its economy, was suffering greatly under the weight of the 
embargoes that had been placed on China.86  The main issue that Britain and other 
countries had with the United States’ export control system was the “China differential,” 
which involved a set of embargoes being placed against China and not the other 
Communist governments of the world. The “China differential” list was created in 1954, 
and resulted from the United States and its allies easing the restrictions placed on the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. In terms of trade, however, the United 
States remained adamant on maintaining full restrictions against China. The United States 
felt that it was important to maintain more pressure on China because they believed that 
restricting China’s ability to acquire resources was important in order to hindered the 
country’s ability to arm itself.  
 Many allies of the United States, however, saw the “China differential” as being 
unnecessary after the fighting in Korea had come to an end, and they wanted to begin 
selling to China in order to help their economies. By 1956 any hope of maintaining the 
multilateral system of export controls on trade with China was quickly disappearing.  The 
push to dismantle the system was led by the British, who publicly stated that they would 
unilaterally withdraw from the system if the United States did not agree to meet their 
requests for a reduction in the system by 15 January 1956. Britain’s withdrawal 
threatened the survival of the entire system. The other nations who participated in the 
system had also been voicing their opposition to the continuation of the embargoes the 
system placed on China, and if a leading nation like Britain left, it would cause a chain-
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reaction that would lead to the whole system falling apart. Canada was placed in the 
uncomfortable position of not wanting to support the system any longer. At the same 
time, the Liberal government of Prime Minister St. Laurent felt that taking actions that 
would upset Canada-U.S. relations would be a mistake; Canada, therefore, took a neutral 
position in the debate and waited to see what happened between Britain and the United 
States before making its intentions known.87  
 Canadian security had always been one of Prime Minister St. Laurent’s primary 
concerns when he examined Canada’s China policy, and he fought more for opening 
relations with the PRC than he did for other aspects of Canada-China relations. The lack 
of economic trade between the PRC and the Western world was also an issue that was 
coming to the forefront of China-Western relations. St. Laurent had examined and 
pressured for the issue of recognition even when some of Canada’s allies had not, but he 
had held back on the issue of expanding trade with the PRC at the same time that most of 
Canada’s allies were fighting hard for the issue.  
 Both Britain and the United States were important to Canada, but they were also 
the leaders of the two opposing camps in debating the differential list. It was for this 
reason that Canada maintained a neutral policy, with the Canadian government refusing 
to support “any proposal not acceptable to the two main opponents.”88 While Canada 
maintained a neutral position officially, unofficially the government agreed with Britain, 
believing that there was no point to the “China differential” after the end of the fighting 
in Korea. Lester Pearson stated in 1957 that the government found it difficult to come up 
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with strategic justification for restricting a large number of items that were included on 
the “China differential” list, and that what was on the list appears to make it resemble a 
form of “economic warfare rather than one of controlling strategic commodities.”89  
 By mid-1957, there was little hope for a continuation of the system, as many 
Western nations sought to expand their economies into markets such as China. U.S. 
President Dwight Eisenhower made one last attempt to save the system, and presented the 
United States’ allies with a new proposal for the “China differential”.  It too eventually 
failed, as major economic powers such as Britain, France, Japan, and Germany rejected 
the American compromise plan. 90 By the end of 1957 the multilateral system had 
collapsed. Except for the United States, Turkey, and Canada, all other NATO countries 
refused to adhere to the “China differential” any longer.91 While it was true that Canada 
had not officially withdrawn from the system, the election of John Diefenbaker to the 
office of Prime Minister of Canada in June 1957 effectively ended Canada’s involvement 
in any practical sense. 
Conclusion 
 Canadian officials have always seen China’s potential and have always been 
eager to find a way to exploit it for Canada’s benefit, but other nations have also wanted 
the same thing and took steps to limit Canada’s influence in China. The United States 
blocked most of Canada’s efforts to establish a relationship with China before the end of 
World War II and what little progress was made by Canada after the war was erased by 
the Communist victory in 1949.  The creation of the PRC on 1 October 1949 changed the 
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dynamic of relations between Mainland China and the Western world as the United 
States now tried to isolate the PRC from the international community. When Prime 
Minister St. Laurent came to power he sought to increase Canadian security by 
strengthening international organizations such as the United Nations. He hoped to make 
the United Nations stronger by making the PRC a part of it, but the United States fiercely 
opposed the entrance of the PRC, preferring that the China seat be occupied by the ROC. 
St. Laurent made no secret of his desire to recognize the PRC as the official government 
of China and have it seated in the United Nations, but with the outbreak of the Korean 
War and the hardening of attitudes in the United States and the Canadian public, he was 
forced to back down. St. Laurent pushed for issues that would increase Canada’s security, 
but when the other allies of the United States, including members of NATO, were 
moving forward with expanding trade with the PRC, Canada held back. That St. Laurent 
pushed for the recognition and seating of the PRC while it was not popular, but not for 
expanding trade when it was popular, shows how he was more focused on Canadian 
security then trade. When St. Laurent left office and his Diefenbaker took over, things 
changed dramatically. 
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Chapter 2 
  
Shifting Priorities and Economic Success: Canada’s Trade with China and its 
Relations with the United States, 1957-1963 
 
 In June 1957, John Diefenbaker was elected Prime Minister leading a Progressive 
Conservative minority government. He campaigned on a platform to expand the market 
for Canadian wheat and help many struggling Prairie wheat farmers and communities 
find a place to sell their products. Diefenbaker’s platform delivered him a win in the 
western wheat producing provinces and made these areas the power base of his 
government.  The Prairie influence on Conservative trade policy only intensified 
following the March 1958 general election, in which Conservatives won 47 of 48 ridings 
in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, contributing to the then-largest majority 
government in Canadian history.  Diefenbaker soon became convinced that the lucrative 
market for wheat on Mainland China presented a golden opportunity to eliminate 
Canadian surpluses of wheat, and he vigorously championed expanded trade relations 
with China before he left office in 1963. 
 The cementing of closer Sino-Canadian economic ties, of course, set the 
Conservative government on a collision course with the successive American 
administrations of Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy.  While the anti-communist 
Diefenbaker did not seriously consider extending diplomatic recognition to China, his 
campaign to foster trade agreements with Beijing was fiercely opposed by Washington.  
As Canada’s primary ally and closest trading partner, the United States aggressively – but 
ultimately unsuccessfully – waged a concerted campaign to undermine Ottawa’s efforts 
to sell wheat to the PRC, a campaign that seriously frayed Canadian-American relations. 
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Exploring the China Market and Early Sino-Canadian Trade Initiatives 1957-1959 
 After entering office, Diefenbaker immediately put the issue of recognition of the 
PRC on the backburner. Instead, he focused his attention on improving trade relations 
between the two countries, with an emphasis on wheat and grain. The issue of recognition 
did not disappear from Canadian politics, but the urgency that it was given under the St. 
Laurent government was diminished greatly. Diefenbaker had long been opposed to 
recognizing the PRC as the official government of China. He knew it was impossible to 
say that the PRC would never be recognized as China’s official government, but he did 
feel that the time was not yet right for recognizing the PRC.92 Diefenbaker developed a 
strategy where Canada would gradually come to recognize the PRC through a process of 
steps involving unofficial contacts, with particular emphasis on trade contacts.93 
Diefenbaker’s strategy had the double benefit of both appeasing those in the government 
who wanted to recognize the PRC, and justifying Diefenbaker’s desire to expand trade 
relations with the PRC.  Many senior officials within the DEA shared Diefenbaker’s 
opinions.  Under-Secretary of State Jules Léger, for example, concluded that trade 
between Canada and the PRC was so small by early 1958 that no change in the 
recognition policy was necessary, while Canada could take advantage of China’s desire 
to expand Sino-Canadian trade contacts.94   
 Just as Diefenbaker believed that eventually there would be no choice but to 
recognize the PRC as the official government of China, the government in Washington 
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was also operating under the same assumption, but was hoping to delay the issue for as 
long as possible. Whether Diefenbaker was hoping that his policy of slowly building 
relations with the PRC would lead to full recognition or was simply trying to delay the 
issue for as long as possible, one thing was clear: Diefenbaker was determined to expand 
economic ties with the PRC.  The first major action taken by the Diefenbaker government 
regarding trade with the PRC was to send a Canadian delegation to China in 1957 for a 
“fact-finding mission” that would, among other things, acquire information that the 
Department of Trade and Commerce would use when attempting to expand trade with the 
PRC.95 The delegation arrived in Mainland China in September 1957 and consisted of the 
Trade Commissioner for Hong Kong, C.M. Forsyth-Smith, and a representative from the 
DEA, Tom Pope.96  
 The decision to undertake the mission was reached when the Canadian 
government received reports that the PRC was interested in purchasing wheat from 
Canada. These reports were later confirmed by the Forsyth-Smith delegation that 
discovered that the PRC was indeed interested in buying Canadian wheat and grain.97 
Forsyth-Smith also noted that Chinese officials were “extremely touchy” about the 
possibility that China might be suffering from agricultural shortfalls.98 In his report to the 
DEA, Pope mentioned that it was difficult to raise and maintain a discussion about trade 
between Canada and the PRC. The officials they met with, whom they had difficulty 
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meeting in the first place, continually brought the conversation back to the issue of 
politics and diplomacy between the two governments.99   
 Pope listed several reasons why he believed that PRC officials were unwilling to 
discuss the issue of bilateral trade, but the most likely, or most important, was that “they 
wished to impress us that China was in no way dependent on Canada or any other 
Western country to meet its import requirements.”100 Pope’s theory would be in keeping 
with previous government assertions that the nationalist pride of the officials and people 
of the PRC would not allow themselves to become dependent on any other foreign power 
for China’s survival. Nevertheless, PRC officials agreed to “negotiate a small purchase of 
a thousand tons of wheat as a gesture of bilateral goodwill.”101  Discussions surrounding 
the consummation of this first wheat agreement floundered, however, as a result of 
regulations established by the Foreign Assets Control (FAC).  Adopted by the 
Eisenhower administration in 1954 under the provisions of the 1917 Trading with the 
Enemy Act, FAC rules prevented foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from 
exporting goods to China.  In the case of the Chinese first wheat order, negotiations with 
the Bunge Corporation, an American-controlled grain company operating in Canada, 
were terminated when Bunge officials expressed concerns that they were violating 
American extraterritoriality statutes.  Ottawa pushed forward and negotiated four 
additional contracts for nearly 45,000 tons of wheat, but several contracts originally 
signed with American-controlled grain companies operating in Canada were transferred 
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to domestic Canadian firms due to threats made by the United States government to 
prosecute U.S. parent corporations under FAC regulations.102 
 Given that the Canadian government was able to find ways around the problems 
presented to it by the United States, the Canadian public did not become aware of the 
situation involving the application of FAC laws affecting Canadian grain agreements 
with China. The situation changed when the Canadian branch of the United Auto 
Workers reported in 1958 that the Ford Motor Company had prevented its Canadian 
subsidiary from taking a Chinese order for one thousand cars. The outrage of the 
Canadian public forced the Diefenbaker government to take immediate action in order to 
highlight the fact that their decision-making process was independent of the United 
States, and that they were not simply following the lead of the United States regarding the 
welfare of the Canadian economy. 
 The government of Louis St. Laurent had wanted to try and preserve the idea of a 
united front against the PRC, but Diefenbaker’s policy was different, as the situation 
among the nations of the Western world had changed drastically in the preceding years. 
After the elimination of the China differential, the idea of showing a unified Western 
front died, as the needs and desires of the individual countries took priority over Western 
unity. Canada was no exception, as actions carried out by the United States proved to be 
increasingly harmful to the Canadian economy. Additionally, it was questionable if the 
United States’ actions even had any measurable effect on the PRC.  To counteract the 
American policies negatively affecting Canada, Diefenbaker used the visit of Dwight 
Eisenhower to Ottawa in July 1958 to personally lobby for a relaxation of FAC 
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regulations.  Eisenhower proved unwilling to completely abandon Washington’s policy 
regarding trade with the PRC, but even he found it difficult to justify many of the actions 
being taken, just as he had with the China differential in the previous years.  One of the 
defenses that Eisenhower raised when he was discussing trade with Diefenbaker was that 
he felt it would be a problem to allow the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to 
conduct trade with the PRC, while at the same time forbidding companies located within 
the United States, and lacking foreign subsidiaries, from conducting the same trade.103 
American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who accompanied Eisenhower to 
Ottawa, also informed his Canadian hosts that “If we open the door too wide for 
subsidiaries we may have to open the door for parents.”104 United States officials did not 
see any urgency in the matter of trade with the PRC, stating that the PRC had not 
increased trade after the issue of the China differential was settled. It was also stated that 
if the PRC had wanted to increase trade, it would have a limited amount of “funds 
available for foreign purchases.”105  
 Despite the fact that the United States officials wanted to take it slow and examine 
the problem before rushing into anything, that was not an option for Diefenbaker. He was 
under pressure from the Canadian public, which was in a fevered nationalist mood, to 
stop the United States government from interfering in Canadian trade with the PRC. The 
end result of the meeting between Diefenbaker and Eisenhower was that a compromise 
was reached between the two leaders. The United States would allow “Canadian 
subsidiaries of American firms to fill orders from the PRC for non-strategic goods” when 
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no Canadian owned firm was capable of meeting such orders and the transactions would 
“have an ‘appreciable effect’ on the Canadian economy.”106 While the arrangement was 
not the solution that Diefenbaker was looking for, it did allow Canada to continue 
pursuing business dealings with the PRC. 
 In the aftermath of the Ottawa meetings, the Eisenhower administration loosened 
– but did not completely dismantle – its policy regarding trade with the PRC, but 
Washington was not happy about it. John Foster Dulles even went so far as to publicly 
state that “Beijing often placed orders simply to generate a clash between Washington, 
DC, and allied government.”107 Dulles’ statement downplayed the importance of 
Canadian trade with the PRC and made it appear that once the disputes over trade with 
the PRC between the United States and its allies ended, the PRC would have no interest 
in conducting actual trade with the Western world. The opening phase of efforts on the 
part of Canada to establish trade with the PRC highlights the difference of opinions 
between the governments of Canada and the United States regarding trade with the PRC. 
Eisenhower’s unwillingness to adopt the Canadian model as general US policy, instead 
choosing to grant exceptions to transactions that it felt were necessary for the welfare of 
its allies’ economies, further highlighted the differences between Ottawa and 
Washington.108 It also highlighted the difference of the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker 
governments, as Diefenbaker was more resilient in his attempts to have Canada pursue an 
independent course from the policies of the United States. The concessions that 
Diefenbaker was able to acquire would prove to be a turning point for Canadian trade 
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with China. The determination of Diefenbaker, and the outrage of the Canadian public 
over what they viewed as interference by the United States in an internal Canadian 
matter, highlighted to Eisenhower and other officials in Washington that they would have 
to adjust their embargo policy regarding the PRC if they wanted to maintain the co-
operation of the Canadian government in the future. Diefenbaker had chosen to pursue a 
different path when addressing the issue of Communist China, which resulted in the 
Canadian public supporting his China policy to a degree that St. Laurent could never 
have hoped for.  Diefenbaker used his surge of support to the fullest and pressured 
Washington whenever it attempted to interfere with Canadian trade. 
The Opening of the Chinese Wheat Market and the Problem of Extraterritoriality 
1959-1961 
 
 The loosening of the United States’ trading policy regarding the PRC came at a 
time when Canada was looking to increase its wheat sales and the PRC was looking to 
increase its purchases. Initial PRC purchases of Canadian wheat in 1957 and 1958 did not 
qualify as large-scale orders in relation to how much wheat Canada produced and how 
much wheat China consumed. By 1959, however, the situation in China was changing, 
and agricultural trade between Canada and China was about to explode.  Rumours 
reached the ears of Canadian officials in the latter half of 1959 that the PRC was looking 
to begin purchasing large-sale amounts of wheat.109 The sudden increase in the amount of 
wheat that the PRC wanted to purchase from Canada could be attributed directly to the 
“Great Leap Forward” program that was instituted in Mainland China. The Great Leap 
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Forward was started in 1958 and would continue until it was abandoned in 1962.110 The 
program was designed to bring about the rapid industrialization of Mainland China, with 
Chairman Moa Zedong wanting to see China overtake Britain, then still considered a 
major industrial power, in the area of steel production.111 Mao’s attempts to bring about 
the quick industrialization of China resulted in massive shortfalls in terms of agricultural 
production, resulting in the PRC being forced to import huge amounts of food from other 
countries. Further complicating the situation was that the pride felt by the leaders of the 
PRC would not allow them to buy food from the other socialist countries to which they 
were allied. The result was the PRC making long-term trading deals with other countries 
to supply them with grains.  
 Canadian officials had already seen first-hand how the PRC officials could be 
sensitive about the ability of the PRC to survive on its own without the aid of foreign 
governments. Their attitude remained the same even during the Great Leap Forward. 
Purchasing food from other nations allowed PRC officials to hold their heads up high by 
conducting ordinary trade transactions that would hide their agricultural shortcomings 
and prevent them from having to beg for aid from other nations, non-communist and 
communist alike.112  Once the decision had been made on the part of the PRC to buy 
wheat from Canada, events moved forward very quickly. The first real indication the 
Canadian government received about the desire of the PRC to purchase wheat from 
Canada came in September of 1960, when the China Resources Company (Cireco) 
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informed the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, C.J. Small, that they were 
interested in purchasing two cargoes of wheat from Canada.113  
 After the PRC made it known that they were interested in purchasing wheat from 
Canada, they quickly set about the process of opening negotiations with Canadian 
officials. The negotiations for the first large-scale orders of wheat by the PRC from 
Canada began in November 1960, when two officials from the PRC arrived in a Montreal 
hotel and asked how they could get in touch with the Canadian Minister of Agriculture, 
Alvin Hamilton.114  When the time came to discuss a wheat purchase with the Chinese 
officials, who were acting on behalf of Cireco, the Canadian Wheat Board, represented 
by W.C. McNamara, the chief commissioner of the board, handled the actual 
negotiations. While McNamara was the official negotiator, several other departments of 
the Canadian government also had an interest in seeing the negotiations succeed, 
including Agriculture, Commerce, and Trade.  
 One of the matters that complicated the process was that Australia had already 
completed its own negotiations with the PRC, which had resulted in Beijing purchasing 
three hundred thousand tons of wheat from them.115 The problem was that the cost of 
Australia’s wheat was almost thirty percent less than Canada’s wheat. While it could be 
argued that Canadian wheat was of a higher quality, the price differential still made 
closing the deal difficult. Representing the Department of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton 
came forward with a proposal that he felt could appease both parties. Hamilton’s 
suggestion was that the Canadian government would give the PRC a gift of wheat worth 
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$6.5 million if the PRC would agree to the purchase of one million tons of Canadian 
wheat.116  Hamilton’s reason for making the proposal was twofold. First, by giving away 
such a large amount of wheat, in addition to the commercial transaction regarding the one 
million tons of wheat that Canada was proposing to sell to the PRC, the total overall price 
for the wheat would be lowered by eighteen cents per bushel.117 The second reason was 
that it would save the Canadian government money from not having to store the wheat. 
That would compensate for the gift to the PRC, thereby further helping to balance out the 
cost of giving away so much wheat for free.118  Hamilton’s suggestion was a good one, 
because it allowed Canada to take advantage of new markets in China, while at the same 
time allowing Canada to still charge a higher rate for its wheat than other countries. 
 Hamilton’s plan also presented certain political challenges that made it difficult to 
implement. Officials in the DEA viewed the proposal as more trouble than it was worth 
because, in their opinion, Australia would see it for what it really was – providing a 
rebate to the PRC in order to move in on a market that Australia was also trying to 
expand into.119 Hamilton had made his suggestion in the hopes of avoiding a price war 
with Australia, but the obviousness of Canada’s intentions could just as easily trigger the 
price war that he had hoped to avoid. If it did cause a price war between Canada and 
Australia, then the PRC would be the only one to benefit from the situation and it would 
hurt Canada’s wheat price worldwide, as other nations who purchased wheat from 
Canada would undoubtedly demand the same price.  
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 Additionally, the United States had a similar program – the notorious Public Law 
480, which saw massive quantities of subsidized US wheat flooding foreign markets – 
that hurt Canada’s ability to sell wheat to its traditional customers and that had been one 
of the main reasons Canada sought to sell to the PRC in the first place.120 Canada had 
made frequent vigorous diplomatic representations protesting against Public Law 480, 
but if Ottawa chose to follow a similar action with regard to trade with the PRC, then the 
Canadian government would lose the ability to lecture the United States about its own 
gift program, which, in the opinion of the DEA, was not worth the potential gain to 
Canada.121  
 The matter of how to proceed was eventually brought before Cabinet, which sided 
with the DEA and decided that the potential benefits to Canada in Hamilton’s plan did 
not outweigh the potential harm that Canada could suffer from following the plan.122 The 
Cabinet decided that instead of offering the PRC a gift with its purchase, it would instead 
sell the PRC “a variety of lower quality grains that effectively reduced the overall price 
of the contract.”123 Hamilton’s plan was full of potential political disasters, yet it was 
given serious consideration by the Cabinet, which stresses how important the success of 
the negotiations between Canada and the PRC were to Diefenbaker and many other 
officials in the Canadian government. 124  
 Despite the fact that Canada was not willing to cave in to pressure from the PRC 
at the negotiation table, the fact remained that the PRC was in desperate need of food.  It 
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was because of their great need that the PRC was unwilling to drag out the negotiations 
with Canadian officials over the issue of the cost of Canadian wheat. Despite the fact that 
the Canadian government was unwilling to lower the cost of Canadian wheat or subsidize 
the cost in any way, other than offering lower grade wheat, an agreement was eventually 
reached between the two parties. On 2 February 1961, Hamilton announced an agreement 
whereby the PRC would purchase 260,000 tons of barley and 750,000 tons of wheat at a 
cost of sixty million dollars.125 One of the things that the Canadian government was most 
happy about was that the PRC did not demand that a line of credit be opened for them to 
purchase the wheat. Instead, they paid for their wheat order in cash at the market level 
price. Hamilton attributed the PRC paying in cash for their order to the nationalist pride 
the PRC officials felt and their desire to maintain the image that they did not require aid 
from other nations to survive. The deal with the PRC had everything that the Canadian 
government could have hoped for, including the possibility of further orders from the 
PRC. 
 The elation felt by Canadian officials, however, subsided quickly after it became 
apparent that the United States would not let the massive wheat order from China go 
unchallenged. The agreement between Diefenbaker and Eisenhower regarding FAC 
regulations and how they affected Canadian subsidiaries of United States parent 
companies was supposed to settle the issue regarding American interference with 
Canadian trade with the PRC.  However, once President John F. Kennedy was elected to 
the White House, problems between the two nations began to arise again. The issue at 
hand was a Canadian subsidiary company, Imperial Oil, which was owned by a United 
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States parent company, Standard Oil, had refused to provide bunkering fuel to the ships 
that had been chartered to carry the wheat that the PRC had purchased to Mainland 
China.126 The company’s refusal to provide fuel in a Canadian port not only threatened 
the deal, but also had the potential to cause major problems for Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker. Much of Canada’s population considered Imperial Oil to be a Canadian 
company and would have been outraged at the idea of the United States not allowing it to 
supply ships carrying Canadian wheat with fuel.  
 Ensuring the ships acquired the fuel they needed became one of the top issues for 
Diefenbaker when he met with Kennedy for the first time in Washington on 20 February 
1961. Ironically, Kennedy was under the same type of pressure as Diefenbaker. Being 
newly elected to the Presidency, he did not want to appear to be relaxing the embargo 
placed on the PRC, resulting in him being un-cooperative with Diefenbaker’s attempts to 
find a way for Canadian subsidiaries to act without approval from parent companies 
located in the United States. In an attempt to find a way around the problem, Kennedy 
offered Diefenbaker a compromise that would see the United States grant Canadian 
subsidiaries a permit allowing them to conduct trade with the PRC; however, in order to 
be granted this permit the Canadian government would have to request it.127 Diefenbaker 
found this compromise to be totally unacceptable because it would not solve the issue of 
domestic outrage in Canada, since many Canadians would have viewed Kennedy’s 
proposal as a continuation of interference in the Canadian economy.128 Kennedy 
remained adamant that Diefenbaker reconsider his position, since, in Kennedy’s view, the 
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compromise he offered was in keeping with the agreement between Diefenbaker and 
Eisenhower in 1958.129  Neither leader proved willing to give ground on the issue, and 
the Washington meeting ended without a solution to the problem being reached.  
Commenting on the results of the Kennedy-Diefenbaker meeting, Canadian Secretary of 
State for External Affairs Howard Green concluded that the United States would have to 
remove any impediments to Sino-Canadian trade themselves. The reason was because the 
actual problem was between the United States government and the parent companies of 
the Canadian subsidiaries in question, which were also located in the United States.130 
The result was that while the Canadian government may not be happy about what was 
happening, all Ottawa could really do was put pressure on one or both parties to change 
their policies, as Canada had no real say in the matter.  
 In the aftermath of the Washington meeting, the United States government made 
several other propositions to the Canadian government, but they all possessed the same 
problem that Kennedy’s original suggestion had, being that they all afforded Washington 
“some degree of control over cargoes being shipped to China” from Canada.131 The 
United States having such a degree of control over Canadian commerce was something 
that the Canadian public would not stand for, which in turn made it impossible for 
Diefenbaker to accept the propositions.  In the end, the United States decided that the 
divisions that were occurring with the Canadian government were not worth the benefits 
of maintaining control over the shipping to Mainland China. Once the United States 
government was willing to loosen its FAC regulations regarding trade with the PRC, 
                                                
129 Graham, “A Colossus and a Conundrum”, 179. 
130 LAC, RG 25 vol. 7607 file 11280-1-40, Green to Diefenbaker, 23 February 1961. 
131 Graham, “A Colossus and a Conundrum”, 180. 
 59 
Imperial Oil was free to provide the needed fuel to the vessels that would transport the 
wheat to Mainland China. 
Expanding Trade Links with China 1961-1963 
 As negotiations were taking place between Canada and the United States on a 
way to ship the wheat from Canada to China, PRC officials were indicating that they 
were interested in negotiating for additional wheat purchases.132 While the Canadian 
government should have been elated over the possibility of selling even larger amounts of 
wheat to the PRC, the reality of the situation dampened their spirits. The previous large 
scale wheat deal that had been negotiated was paid for in cash by the PRC; however, if 
the new orders were even larger, then it would not be possible for the PRC to pay for 
them in cash, and would instead require a line of credit in order to handle paying for such 
a large amount of wheat.  
 The issue that came before Cabinet in early March 1961, when the PRC 
announced that they would be interested in “additional sales mounting to some 2-3 
million tons ‘if suitable financing could be arranged.’”133 The reason for Canada’s 
hesitation was simple: the United States had been difficult to deal with when the previous 
contract had involved a cash payment, and it was unlikely that they would be as 
accommodating if the Canadian government decided to extend credit to the PRC. The 
Canadian government also remembered the fact that they had extended loans to the 
Chinese Nationalist government, as well as several companies that had operated with that 
government. When the Nationalists had lost the war and been unable to pay, the PRC had 
refused to honour the debt accumulated by the Nationalists. Despite the fact that the PRC 
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and the Canadian government had disagreements in the past, and that the United States 
might object to Canada extending credit to the PRC, the opportunity to sell such a large 
amount of wheat was too good to pass up. 
  A deal was quickly finalized between the Canadian Wheat Board and the PRC on 
22 April 1961, by which the PRC would purchase “between 3 and 5 million tons of wheat 
and between 600 000 and 1 million tons of barley … in addition to approximately 30 000 
tons of Canadian flour.”134 The wheat and barley were to be delivered to China before the 
end of 1963 and the PRC would pay 25% cash with the balance due in nine months at 
5.5% interest. The Canadian government had been worried about how the United States 
would respond to Canada extending credit to the PRC for purchasing additional supplies 
of wheat; however, the initial reaction of the United States was better then the Canadian 
government had hoped for.  
 When Alvin Hamilton announced the deal in the House of Commons, the reaction 
from the Canadian public was also quite positive. Hamilton pointed out that the benefits 
of the deal would expand beyond the wheat farmers of Canada. He talked about the fact 
that the increase in the farmers’ income would help benefit local economies by increasing 
the spending power of the farmers and help maintain the economies of farming 
communities.135 Additionally, other areas of the Canadian economy that were not directly 
involved in the production of Canadian wheat would also benefit from the deal. As the 
wheat needed to be shipped to Mainland China from Canadian ports, the wheat needed to 
be stored and transported to the ports before being shipped. Hamilton specifically 
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identified “country and terminal elevator operators, railway and dock workers and others 
engaged in the domestic handling and export movement of grain and flour” as people and 
industries that would benefit from the conclusion of the deal.136 Several officials who 
were involved in Canada’s agricultural industry also came out in favour of the deal, 
including G. L. Harrold, the president of the Alberta Wheat Pool, Alf Gleave, the 
president of the National Farmers’ Union and the Saskatchewan Farmers’ Union, and 
Charles Gibbings, the president of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool.137 
 When the United States government had originally learned about the deal, they 
reacted with restrained support, stating that removing so much grain from the world 
market would help with the oversupply of grain in the world market. Washington also 
deemed that the PRC using up its foreign currency reserves to buy food as opposed to 
military items to be in its best interests.138 However, the positive opinion displayed by the 
United States quickly changed.  In early June the United States Treasury Department 
decided to stop the exporting of vacuators made in the United States to Canada. 
Vacuators were special suction devices required to load the grain onto oil tankers for 
shipment. The Treasury Department stopped the exportation by invoking FAC 
regulations, as it had in the past, to stop or hinder trade between Canada and the PRC. 
Surprisingly, the Treasury Secretary, Douglas Dillon, had been unaware of what had been 
done to stop the export of the vacuators and was adamant that a solution be found before 
the issue began to disrupt relations between Canada and the United States, particularly 
after Diefenbaker telephoned John F. Kennedy to demand that the restrictions on the 
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export of vacuators to Canada be lifted. Within a matter of days the State Department 
offered a solution where the equipment in question would be granted “licenses as a 
special concession to the Canadian government.”139 The dispute over the vacuators would 
be the last major occurrence of interference by the United States, regarding Canada’s 
right to sell wheat to the PRC. 
 Though Canada was now able to sell wheat to the PRC without having to worry 
about direct interference from the United States, the complexities of the Cold War would 
not make it possible to separate Canada’s wheat deals from the efforts of the United 
States to isolate China.  In somewhat of an ironic twist, Washington now sought to use 
Canadian wheat deals they had once vigorously opposed as a lever to extend their 
influence in Asia. The United States first raised the possibility of using Canada’s trade 
relation with the PRC to provide political and strategic advantages for the Western world 
in a high-level meeting in Ottawa in January 1962.140  Washington had requested the 
meeting because the Kennedy administration took the situation in Vietnam very 
seriously. The United States intelligence agencies had become convinced that the PRC 
was the cause of the “aggressive and subversive actions” being perpetrated against South 
Vietnam by the North Vietnamese.141 The plan proposed by the United States called for 
Canada to indicate to the PRC that in order for future grain deals to be possible the PRC 
would have to curtail its actions in Vietnam. The Canadian officials who were present at 
the meeting expressed their doubts about the proposal and the meeting ended without an 
agreement, though the two sides did agree to meet at a later date with officials from the 
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Australian government included in the meeting. The second meeting did not do much to 
change Canada’s position, and the Australians joined Canada in expressing their doubts 
about the United States’ proposal achieving any realistic goals.142  
 The United States was not the only nation to attempt to use Canada’s trade with 
the PRC for its own benefit. India also approached Canada hoping to receive Canada’s 
aid in dealing with the PRC.  In October 1962, a border clash broke out between the PRC 
and India, which was a member of the British Commonwealth along with Canada. After 
the PRC invaded the area under dispute, the northeastern region of Ladakh, India 
demanded that Canada use its influence to punish China.143 The request by India was 
different from the request by the United States because there could be no questioning 
how involved the PRC was in its border dispute with India. Also, India was a friend and 
ally of Canada’s.  While Canada supported India in the dispute, Diefenbaker also highly 
valued the amount of wheat that the PRC was buying and wanted to protect future sales, 
as his government relied so much on the political support of the western grain producing 
provinces.144 There was no simple way around the problem for the Canadian government, 
but it tried its best to find a middle ground between the two parties. In the end, Canada 
decided to “send six military transports to India and suspended all exports to China 
(without telling anyone, including the Chinese), except wheat.”145  
 St. Laurent had believed that stability in the international community was 
essential to Canadian security and wanted to bring the PRC out of isolation to decrease 
the level of tension in the world. Diefenbaker had the opportunity to try and decrease the 
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level of tension between the PRC and a close ally of Canada’s, but was unwilling to take 
action that could potentially hurt Canada’s success at selling wheat to the PRC. The 
conflict between India and the PRC was the clearest example of the differences between 
Diefenbaker and St. Laurent when it came to their priorities involving the PRC. For St. 
Laurent it was Canadian security and for Diefenbaker it was Canadian trade. 
 The wheat that Canada sent to the PRC could not be classified as a purely military 
product as it was also used for civilian consumption. Some of the other commodities that 
Canada traded to the PRC, however, could be viewed easily in a military light. An 
example would be on 23 October 1962, when the Cabinet heard from the Minister of 
Trade and Commerce, George Hees, about a Canadian company that was hoping to 
acquire a permit that would allow for the export of 130 car engines to the PRC.146 The 
Cabinet denied the request for a permit on the basis of the military potential of the 
engines. At the same meeting Cabinet decided “no export permits would be granted for 
goods to China with the exception of grain.”147 Cabinet’s decision did little to appease 
India, as they viewed the wheat being provided to the PRC by Canada as the fuel that 
powered the PRC war machine, and allowed them to continue their invasion of India.148  
 Once it became clear that Canada would not stop its wheat deals with the PRC, 
the Indian government tried several other approaches to try and reduce the amount of 
wheat that Canada was sending to the PRC. The Indian government asked Canada to 
slow down the wheat shipments to the PRC, cancel future wheat deals between the two 
countries, and, if that was not possible, to conduct future deals on a “cash-and-carry 
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basis” in order to limit the size of future deals.149 Despite the fact that India had a very 
justifiable reason to want to stop the wheat shipments to the PRC, Canada did not want to 
risk the new market it had worked so long and hard to gain access to, as well as one that 
promised to be so profitable.  The conflict between India and the PRC produced trouble 
for Canada, but the Sino-Indian conflict itself was very brief, lasting until November 
1962.150 Once the conflict was over, the Canadian government then abandoned the export 
restrictions placed on the PRC, and began looking for ways that they could increase the 
trade that Canada conducted with the PRC.  
 Canada had every reason to want to expand trade with the PRC, as the wheat 
deals had been quite profitable to Canada. The situation changed, however, in that the 
PRC was no longer interested in simply buying from Canada. Instead, it wanted to supply 
Chinese goods to the Canadian market. In January 1963, the Canadian government, at the 
urging of George Hees, began looking at ways to expand its trade with the PRC in new 
areas. Hees wanted Canada to start shipping metals and pharmaceuticals to the PRC, and 
asked the Cabinet to give export permits to a number of companies that wanted to sell 
these goods. Cabinet was willing to grant permits to allow for the sale of pharmaceuticals 
to the PRC, but the metals, specifically aluminum and stainless steel, were denied, as the 
DEA argued that their sale would create additional problems between Canada and its 
allies. When the PRC received word that Canada would be holding back on the sale of 
the metals, it went on the offensive, and attempted to use its newfound importance to the 
Canadian economy to its advantage. The PRC made it clear to the Canadian government 
that if it did not sell stainless steel to the PRC then there would be serious doubts about 
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whether or not the PRC would place future wheat orders with Canada. When Hees 
learned of the veiled threat made by the PRC he demanded that the Cabinet change its 
position and allow for the export of non-strategic goods to the PRC.151  With the fear of 
losing future wheat deals that had proven so beneficial to the Canadian economy, the 
Cabinet quickly reversed its position, and approved “export permits for nearly three tons 
of stainless steel and twenty-two tons of aluminum ingots.”152 The Cabinet stated, after 
the deal was complete, that it had no plans to carry out an actual change of its exporting 
policy to the PRC; however, the Cabinet had in reality been considering such a change in 
policy for a number of months before the deal to ship metals to the PRC was actually 
announced.  
 The large wheat deal that was concluded between Canada and the PRC in 1961 
was set to expire in 1963. The Canadian government was looking to finalize a new deal, 
but the PRC would not agree to do so unless Canada was willing to open its own market 
to Chinese goods. The PRC was concerned about the growing trade imbalance between 
Canada and the PRC, “which saw 126 million dollars in exports to China in 1962 and 
only 3.2 million dollars of imports from China.”153  The main problem that the PRC had 
with importing goods into Canada lay in the tariff system that Canada employed when 
calculating the duty of Chinese goods entering the country.154 The Department of 
National Revenue was responsible for determining the value of tariffs placed on goods 
from the PRC, and used high prices from the United States to calculate the duty on 
                                                
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 John George Diefenbaker Centre Archives, vol. 532 series XII, Robertson to 
Diefenbaker, 8 March 1963. 
154 Donaghy and Stevenson, “The Limits of Alliance”, 44. 
 67 
textiles entering from Mainland China, which were considerably cheaper than textiles 
from the United States. Cicero, the Chinese state trading company, wanted the duty 
system changed so that the duty of goods from Mainland China would be more fairly 
calculated, and be based on the duty rates that Canada employed to the goods coming 
from Japan and Hong Kong. The PRC saw the entry into Canada of China-made textiles 
as a means of correcting the trade imbalance between Canada and the PRC. The 
Canadian government was hesitant to commit to this, fearing it would have severe 
repercussions on the Canadian textile industry.155 
 The hesitance of the Canadian government furthers the argument that Diefenbaker 
was not looking to use economic contacts with the PRC to slowly build up to recognition, 
but was interested only in expanding the Canadian economy into China for the benefit of 
Canada. Diefenbaker fought hard to allow the exporting of goods to the PRC, but did not 
want to import goods that had the potential to harm domestic Canadian jobs or 
businesses. Expanding trade with the PRC was only a good thing to Diefenbaker if the 
balance was in Canada’s favour; when it moved to benefit the PRC, and could potentially 
harm the Canadian economy, Diefenbaker’s desire to increase trade between the two 
governments evaporated.  
 The PRC’s desire to export textiles to Canada was an issue that would weigh 
heavily on Diefenbaker for the rest of his time in office. Though the PRC had stated that 
they wished to address the trade imbalance and that future wheat deals would be 
dependent on righting the imbalance, the PRC still required wheat to help alleviate the 
famine occurring in China. With the situation as it was, the PRC concluded another wheat 
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deal with Canada on 14 December 1962, for thirty-nine million bushels of wheat valued 
at sixty-five million dollars.156 The new deal had terms of “25 percent down and the 
balance on a twelve month credit cycle.”157  The Canadian government had hoped to 
extend the credit for only nine months, but was forced to offer a longer credit cycle, 
because France had recently concluded a treaty with the PRC for selling them wheat on 
credit and had given the PRC a credit period of eighteen months.158 Australia was also 
hinting that they would be open to extending favourable terms to the PRC in future wheat 
deals.159  
 With a new wheat deal secured, Diefenbaker turned his attention to the issue of 
the textile trade with the PRC. In order to try and find a resolution, the Canadian 
government sent the issue to the Interdepartmental Committee on Low Cost Imports to 
evaluate the situation. The Committee decided that opening the Canadian market to 
textiles from the PRC would alienate Japan, another important Asian ally of Canada’s, 
who had been selling low-cost textiles to Canada and who had voluntarily curbed the 
amount of textiles it shipped into the Canadian market. Though the committee had come 
to the conclusion that opening the Canadian market to more goods from the PRC, 
especially textiles, would cause problems for Canadian industries, the matter did not end 
there. Some of the senior ministers took the work of the committee and expanded on it, 
coming to the conclusion that they wanted the Cabinet to “permit more Chinese non-
sensitive goods to enter Canada and establish an import quota of three million dollars for 
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sensitive goods.”160 Other officials, such as the deputy minister of foreign affairs, 
Norman Robertson, believed that opening Canadian markets to Chinese textiles would 
not improve the odds of greater wheat sales to the PRC, and urged Diefenbaker to oppose 
the issue. Diefenbaker ultimately decided to veto the motion, as it was an election year 
and the opening of the Canadian market to large quantities of Chinese textiles would have 
hurt his chances of being re-elected. In the end, it did not matter what Diefenbaker did, as 
he lost the April 1963 election to a Liberal minority government led by Lester B. 
Pearson. 
Conclusion 
 Diefenbaker opposed recognition of the PRC as the official government of China, 
yet his administration did more to move the issue forward through indirect means than 
the St. Laurent administration. Diefenbaker built links with the PRC through the use of 
trade agreements that increased in size over time and helped to bring official relations 
between the two countries closer together. He also moved Canada farther away from the 
position of the United States, in regards to isolating the PRC, by building official 
agreements between the PRC and Canada, though he was careful not to hurt Canada’s 
economic relationship with the United States. Finally, Diefenbaker took a firmer stance in 
doing what he considered best for the welfare of Canada, even if it was at the expense of 
Western unity. Diefenbaker’s primary concern regarding China was expanding trade with 
Mainland China to the point that it eclipsed all other China related matters. St. Laurent 
had hoped to decrease the level of tension in the international community, but 
Diefenbaker was willing to let the tension level increase rather than risk hurting Canada’s 
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newly formed trade relationship with the PRC. St. Laurent and Diefenbaker moved in 
opposite directions when they began developing their China policies and their actions 
clearly reflected the different priorities that they had when dealing with the PRC. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 A Return to Recognition and Postponement:  
The Pearson Government’s Contribution to Canada-China Relations, 1963-1968 
 
 The political fortunes of Canada changed in April 1963 with the Progressive 
Conservative government of John Diefenbaker being defeated in an election by the 
Liberal Party under the leadership of Lester Pearson. The change in government also 
signaled a return to the issue of recognizing the PRC as the official government of China, 
as opposed to the Conservative government’s policy of official non-recognition while 
building trade deals with the PRC.  Diefenbaker’s strategy had advanced relations 
between Canada and the PRC and benefited the Canadian economy; however, Pearson 
decided that the time was right to move forward with the issue of recognizing the PRC. 
Pearson had proven himself to be a talented diplomat in the United Nations, but his 
success at being a diplomat did not necessarily translate into good skills as a Prime 
Minister dealing with foreign affairs.  The diplomatic recognition of the PRC would 
come closer to completion than it had ever before, but it would not be easy, and every 
time the Canadian government was about to act a new problem would occur to derail its 
plans. 
The Evolution of Canada’s China Strategy, 1963-1964 
  
 Lester Pearson was perhaps one of the few Prime Ministers who was better 
known for what he achieved before taking office than for what he did while in office. 
Pearson’s attempts to recognize the PRC were fueled more by domestic pressure to 
recognize the PRC than an actual desire on his part to do so, but the domestic pressure 
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was enough that he remained open to the idea, though he did so cautiously. 161 By 1963 
the attitude of the Canadian public had begun to shift, with Canadians coming to accept 
the fact that the PRC’s control of China was not going to end simply because other 
countries in the world chose to ignore it. A more important change in attitude, however, 
was that many Canadians did not want to ignore the PRC.  
 Although Diefenbaker had left office, that did not mean that trade with the PRC 
had become any less important to the Canadian economy. Between 1961 and 1966 fifteen 
percent of Canada’s annual wheat exports went to Communist China.162 With the PRC 
purchasing such large amounts of wheat from Canada, especially from areas where the 
Conservative Party continued to find support, the Liberals found themselves presented 
with a unique opportunity. With trade between Canada and the PRC being so important 
to the Conservative Party, which formed the Opposition in the House of Commons after 
the 1963 election, it made it difficult for the Opposition to argue effectively against 
recognition.  
 At the same time, Canadians also began to have doubts about the trust-worthiness 
of the United States and its anti-communist policies. The situation in Vietnam was being 
used as a prime example of the United States’ shortcomings in dealing with the spread of 
communism around the globe.163 With recognition gaining favour, and the United States’ 
policies losing favour, Pearson saw an opportunity to recognize the PRC as the official 
government of China.  The primary problem that Pearson faced was how Canada should 
carry out the issue of recognition in a way that would be acceptable to both the PRC and 
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the United States. The main issue that hindered the development of Canada’s recognition 
of the PRC was the status of Taiwan. The United States would not allow the PRC to 
claim control of Taiwan, and the PRC would not relinquish what it viewed to be its 
rightful claim to Taiwan.164  
 Attempting to solve the problem that it faced, the Liberal government developed a 
new strategy for recognizing the PRC. The idea was similar to John Diefenbaker’s idea of 
building unofficial contacts with the PRC before moving on to creating official contacts 
with them. The new plan was to recognize the PRC in the United Nations before 
officially recognizing the government in Peking.165  One of the key architects of the new 
Liberal policy was Norman Robertson, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. 
Robertson came to his idea in August 1963 after the DEA completed its own internal 
review of Canada’s China policy, the first major review since 1958. Robertson concluded 
that recognition of the PRC was inevitable and it only came down to when and how.  
 Though Robertson was the one who developed the plan, it was championed by the 
new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, who had opposed Pearson’s 
attempts to seat the PRC in the 1950s, but who was also a firm supporter of universal 
representation in the United Nations.166 Martin and Robertson believed that their plan 
would help to ease the worries of other nations, especially the United States, about 
Canada’s attempts to recognize the PRC. Martin was capable of planning ahead and saw 
how the world was changing and what that meant for the foreign policy of Canada. In a 
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January 1964 press conference, Martin talked about the trend of isolating communist 
countries moving in the other direction, with many nations choosing to recognize 
communist governments.167 Furthermore, Martin had begun to see that the world was 
becoming a smaller place, with the various nations of the world “becoming more 
dependent on each other in several fields, including trade.”168  
 But Prime Minister Pearson, who did not want to raise expectations with the 
belief that the government would finally be able to come through on the recognition 
issue, thwarted Martin’s early efforts.169 Pearson was cautious in his attempt to 
immediately recognize the PRC, because he did not believe there was a compelling 
reason to do so with Canada’s trade deals with the PRC secure.170 He was also cautious 
because of his concern about the potential actions of the United States.171 With trade 
money from the PRC already entering the Canadian economy and his fear of the United 
States, Pearson did not believe the issue had real significance for Canada. Many officials 
in various levels of the Canadian government, including MPs and Ministers, disagreed 
with Pearson’s assessment, as they believed that opening lines of communication with the 
PRC would help to ensure the security of Canada. When dealing with issues involving 
China, Pearson seems to have been focused on the immediate problems and chose to deal 
with problems as they arose instead of planning ahead for them.  
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 In January 1964, France recognized the PRC as the official government of China, 
which brought the issue of recognition back to the forefront of international politics. 172  
France’s recognition of the PRC demanded a response from the United States and caused 
Washington to once again harden its position regarding the Communist government.  As 
the Vietnam War was going on as France recognized the PRC, the United States 
government did not want to appear as though it were softening its stance on communism 
and the PRC. The reaffirming of the United States’ position could be attributed to 
anticipation of the election in November 1964, and President Lyndon Johnson did not 
think that taking any action that might hint at a change in relations between the PRC and 
the United States would be wise.173  In addition to reaffirming its position, the United 
States rejected the idea of Canada “exchanging trade or even quasi-diplomatic missions 
with Peking.”174 The United States also attempted to ensure that Taiwan remained the 
representative of China in the United Nations. To help secure Taiwan’s position in the 
United Nations, Washington began to put pressure on its NATO allies to remember the 
“importance Washington attached to a ‘favourable’ vote on the ‘important question’ 
resolution at the General Assembly that autumn.”175  The actions of the United States in 
the months after France recognized the PRC temporarily put an end to the debate of 
whether or not the time was right for Canada to continue with its own plans for 
recognition. That Pearson had given up hope of recognizing the PRC did not mean, 
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however, that the Canadian government was not looking at various other strategies for 
bringing the PRC into the international community.  
 The United States had often used the argument that conferring recognition on the 
PRC or granting the PRC a seat in the United Nations would essentially be rewarding it 
for bad behaviour. The United States pointed to things such as the entry of the PRC into 
the Korean War, the crisis in the Straits of Taiwan, and the PRC’s support of the North 
Vietnamese in the Vietnam War as reasons why the PRC should continue to be isolated 
by the other countries of the world.176  Paul Martin did not agree with the assessment of 
the situation made by Washington. He viewed the isolation of Mainland China as merely 
stopping the rest of the world from being able to communicate and interact with its 
government in a way that would give nations a more effective means of influencing the 
PRC.177 Martin’s opinion was shared by some members of the Canadian government who 
also believed that the PRC should be recognized and seated in the United Nations, despite 
opposition from Washington that would likely not subside for the foreseeable future. 
 The issue came down to the same fundamental argument that had been going on 
between the United States and its allies since the PRC won the Chinese Civil War: should 
the PRC be isolated from the international community to try and force them to modify 
their policies and behaviour, or should the international community actively engage with 
the PRC to try and convince them to change? The United States had always been an 
advocate of the isolationist policy; however, many of its allies did not believe that the 
policy could succeed. Some, like Britain and France, had actively abandoned the policy 
and chosen to recognize the PRC as the official government of China. 
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Canadian Strategy in the United Nations and U.S. Interference, 1964-1966 
 
 With the pathway to full diplomatic recognition blocked, Martin focused on the 
issue of seating the PRC in the United Nations. Though many of the arguments used by 
the United States against recognition could also be used against the PRC gaining entry 
into the United Nations, Martin determined that it was Canada’s best option and began to 
explore how to bring it about.  There was more to Martin’s new approach to handling the 
recognition of the PRC than making the best of a bad situation. John Diefenbaker had 
started with trade agreements because he viewed them as the best way to advance the 
issue of recognition as much as could be done under the circumstances; the same was true 
of Martin’s efforts to get the PRC into the United Nations.  It was Martin’s hope to gain 
enough support among the various members of the United Nations to pass a version of a 
“two Chinas” plan for the United Nations.178  
 Under Martin’s plan, the PRC would take over the official position of China and 
gain the ability to vote for the country; however, Taiwan would also be recognized as 
having its own “international status and relationship.”179 A solution similar to Martin’s 
was viewed by many Western observers as the best way to settle the issue, and it would 
be less humiliating for the United States than having the PRC representative replace the 
ROC representative outright. Just as Diefenbaker had advanced Canada’s China policy by 
creating unofficial contacts, so too did Martin, as he tried to advance the China policy by 
trying to take small steps towards recognition.  
 The DEA also did not believe that it would be possible for the United States to 
hold its position on the PRC, despite the “aggressive, isolationist, and wholly distrustful 
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attitude of the Chinese.”180  DEA officials believed the government would find itself in a 
position where it would have no choice but to recognize the PRC before the end of 
1965.181 Martin pressured Pearson to bring his proposal for seating both the ROC and the 
PRC in the United Nations to Washington in the hope of building support for the 
resolution.182 Pearson would bring Martin’s plan to Washington, but given that France’s 
recognition of the PRC was still fresh in the minds of officials in Washington, Pearson 
meet with no success. 183 
 Though Martin had worked tirelessly to promote his agenda regarding foreign 
policy, there was also a domestic side to his plans. The DEA had long acknowledged that 
if Canada had simply chosen to recognize the PRC after the United States it would be a 
blow against Canadian independence. The Department feared that other nations would 
view Canada and Canadian policy as nothing more than a puppet of the United States if 
Canada failed to act before Washington. The Department’s fear made it important that 
Canada move to recognize the PRC before the United States in order to assert the 
independence of Canadian foreign policy184 
 Despite the fact that Martin viewed seating the PRC in the United Nations as 
being the best course of action, that did not mean that it was an easy course to follow. 
Even the DEA had to admit that the United States’ position was strong enough to 
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maintain the status quo during the 1964 session, though they also believed that it was 
unlikely that the United States would be able to maintain their position the following 
year.185 Martin used the 1964 NATO Ministerial meetings, which took place in May 
1964, as a means of ascertaining the positions and plans of other nations regarding the 
vote pertaining to the PRC’s admission into the United Nations.186 Martin came to the 
conclusion that France and a number of African nations would vote for the admission of 
the PRC to the United Nations on the basis of a simple majority vote.187 He was also able 
to learn that if the vote for the admission of the PRC would require a two-thirds majority 
to win, then other nations such as Denmark, Britain, and Japan would also be willing to 
vote in the PRC’s favour.188 With the information gained from other NATO members, 
DEA officials saw that support for the PRC was growing and it was possible that the PRC 
could be admitted into the United Nations, though the role of Taiwan was still uncertain. 
 The most important development had to do with the growing tension between the 
PRC and the Soviet Union.  While the brief border war that had occurred between the 
PRC and India in 1962 had caused problems for Canada’s wheat deals with the PRC, it 
also had some beneficial aspects for the Canadian government. When the conflict broke 
out the Soviet Union refused to support the PRC in an event that became known as the 
“Sino-Soviet split”, and many Western observers saw an opportunity to further alienate 
Peking from Moscow.189  A despatch dated 16 September 1964 from the Canadian Trade 
Commissioner in Hong Kong reported that in a recent interview that took place between 
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Mao Zedong and a group of Socialists from Japan, the PRC leader had struck some 
“shrewd blows at the USSR.”190 Mao’s actions were viewed by the Canadian government 
as an attempt by the PRC to isolate both the United States and the Soviet Union from the 
rest of the world, while at the same time having the PRC expand its own policies and 
influence.191  It became clear to the Canadian government that while the PRC might have 
spoken publicly about the union and cooperation of all communist countries against the 
capitalist West, the truth was that the PRC was only interested in advancing its own goals 
and interests. The DEA believed that opening more lines of communication with 
Mainland China would help further divide Moscow and Peking and hopefully keep them 
from mending their relationship.  
 Another major development occurred in October 1964, when the Chinese had 
managed to detonate a nuclear device.192 This provoked different reactions in different 
countries. The United States, along with many of its Pacific allies, viewed the detonation 
as evidence of the highly aggressive nature of the PRC, and used it to further their 
argument that the PRC should be kept out of the United Nations.193 The United States 
renewed its claim that the PRC had to “conform to United Nations standards before it 
could be accepted into membership.”194  Many other governments disagreed with the 
assessment made by the United States and its allies. Nations who had been in favour of 
the PRC joining the United Nations saw the PRC’s actions as further evidence that the 
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current situation was not working. Keeping the PRC out of the United Nations would 
make it more difficult for the organization to move forward with disarmament talks 
between its various members.195  
 Many people in the Canadian government, including Martin, took the PRC’s 
actions as evidence that Mainland China needed to be brought into the United Nations as 
a means of controlling the PRC.196  In the end, the issue of Chinese representation in the 
United Nations was not given a vote in 1964 at the UNGA due to an ongoing dispute 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The dispute had to do with the funding 
of peacekeeping operations, which had resulted in a financial crisis for the United 
Nations.197  The adjournment of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly was 
actually to Canada’s benefit because Canadian officials had placed themselves in a 
difficult position no matter what action they took. In a meeting between the delegations 
to the United Nations from the United States and Canada, Martin expressed a desire to 
the United States officials that he would be happy to see the China issue delayed.198   
 The postponement was the result of a dispute regarding Article XIX of the United 
Nations General Assembly Charter, specifically with the section dealing with the 
financial obligations of the members of the Assembly for the United Nations 
peacekeeping forces.199 Martin was not happy with the reason for the postponement, but 
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“he would be happy to see a postponement to delay a showdown on the Chinese 
question.”200  
 When the General Assembly of the United Nations was in session for the 
nineteenth meeting Martin addressed the Assembly and spoke about Canada’s 
commitment to the idea of universal representation in the United Nations.201 He also 
made veiled references to the fact that the PRC was not a part of the United Nations 
despite the fact it had become a major power of the world and was home to a significant 
portion of the world’s population. Specifically, he talked about how universal 
membership must remain the organization’s “ultimate goal so long as any significant 
segment of the world’s population remains unrepresented in this forum.”202  
 While Martin had talked about the desire of Canada for universal representation in 
the United Nations, the Canadian Cabinet had instead decided that Canada would 
continue voting for the Important Question and Albanian resolutions as it had in the past. 
The Albanian resolution had been introduced in 1949, and called for a direct switch 
regarding Chinese representation in the United Nations; it had failed to win a majority 
vote in every meeting of the General Assembly since it was first proposed.203 The 
Important Question resolution was created in response to the growing movement of 
nations calling for the PRC to be seated as the representative of China in the United 
Nations. The Important Question resolution was introduced into the General Assembly in 
1961 and declared that the issue of Chinese representation was an important question and 
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thus two-thirds of the votes were required for a motion to pass instead of the usually 
majority.204 The motion was introduced during every meeting of the General Assembly 
since it was first introduced in 1961 and had been passed each time. 
 If the Canadian delegation had voted, as it was instructed after Martin had made 
his comments, it would have been humiliating for Martin personally and diplomatically 
for the Canadian government. Though Canada had managed to avoid a humiliating 
situation at the nineteenth meeting of the General Assembly, Martin was determined to 
continue on in his quest to try and bring the PRC out of isolation. In 1965 Canadian 
officials believed that a solid front had been created among the members of the United 
Nations who sought to have the PRC seated in the organization.205 Martin and the DEA 
believed that it would be possible to make progress on the issue of seating the PRC in the 
United Nations; however, an unexpected outburst by a PRC official derailed those hopes. 
Just before the twentieth meeting of the General Assembly took place in 1965, the 
Foreign Minister of the PRC government, Chen Yi, held a press conference in which he 
outlined the conditions that would have to be met before the PRC would be willing to 
join the United Nations.206   
 According to Chen, before joining the United Nations, the PRC would require 
“the expulsion of representatives from the Nationalist Republic of China, an apology 
from the General Assembly for labeling the PRC an aggressor in the Korean War, and the 
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reform of the UN Charter to throw out all ‘imperialist puppets.’”207 Shortly after Chen’s 
outburst, Prime Minister Pearson remarked to the Canadian Cabinet that “recent 
developments suggested that the solid front which had been maintained toward the entry 
of Communist China into the United Nations might be broken.”208  The reaction of the 
United States to Chen’s statement was swift and decisive, with the Ambassador for the 
United States, Arthur Goldberg, addressing the United Nations General Assembly. 
Goldberg told the General Assembly that for the PRC to be allowed entrance into the 
United Nations after the action of Minister Chen “would be tantamount – in light of 
Communist China’s belligerent attitudes – to yielding to undisguised blackmail.”209 
Pearson had been cautious and hesitant since first taking office whenever the issue of 
seating the PRC in the United Nations was raised, and with the actions of PRC Minister 
Chen, the hardening of the United States’ position, and an election in November of that 
year, he was unwilling to change Canada’s voting position in the United Nations.210  
 Martin could have pushed Pearson on the issue, but he had his own doubts about 
going forward at the time. His primary concern was that the United States would finally 
act on their threat of withdrawing from the United Nations if the PRC was seated at the 
expense of the ROC government.211 Both Pearson and Martin agreed to let the issue rest 
for the moment, but they would continue to lobby for the seating of the PRC, except it 
would be done privately.212  The remarks made by Chen had hurt the efforts of those 
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supporting the PRC, but it also highlighted a danger that existed by continuing to keep 
the PRC out of the United Nations. Martin had long feared that if the United States did 
not compromise on some of the issues that existed between the United States and the 
PRC, then the end result would be the PRC being seating in the United Nations on its 
own terms. With the demands being made by Foreign Minister Chen, it appeared that was 
exactly what the PRC was trying to do.213   
 With the situation in the United Nations as it was, the vote on the Albanian 
resolution at the 1965 meeting of the General Assembly was important. The Albanian 
resolution had never been passed before, but when the vote was held a tie was reached, 
with 47 countries voting for and against the resolution; there were a further 20 
abstentions.214 There was no real danger of the PRC being seated as a result of the vote, 
because prior to the vote on the Albanian resolution, a vote had been taken to decide if 
the vote to seat the PRC should be declared an important question. The resolution to 
declare the seating of the PRC to be an important question was put forward by a number 
of countries, including Australia, Japan, and the United States. The resolution passed with 
56 votes in its favour, 49 against it, and 10 abstentions.215 With the resolution being 
passed a two-thirds majority vote would be required in order for the PRC to be declared 
the Chinese representative in the United Nations, which did not occur.216  
 The real danger for the nations who opposed the seating of the PRC in the United 
Nations lay in the symbolic damage that could have occurred if the Albanian resolution 
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was defeated. For a majority of nations in the General Assembly to vote for a resolution 
that the United States opposed would be humiliating for the United States, and could 
potentially erode the remaining support that it had on the issue. While Chen’s actions had 
sabotaged Canada’s efforts to seat the PRC, the DEA did not see the setback as being a 
long-term problem, with the PRC making unreasonable demands and being unwilling to 
back down on some issues.   
 The United States was under the impression that the PRC had adopted a hostile 
attitude as a means of forcing its way into the United Nations; however, Canada and 
Britain disagreed with that assessment, and believed that the PRC was simply trying to 
get the most they could out of the situation.217 By adopting an aggressive policy, the PRC 
would be able to use it for propaganda purposes, while at the same time not hurting its 
prospects for entry into the United Nations, as the United States seemed determined to 
block their entry, regardless of what actions the PRC took.218  
 Since the Canadian view was that the PRC had not actually changed its long-term 
strategy for dealing with the United Nations, Martin and the DEA came to the decision to 
continue examining ways to seat the PRC in the organization.219 One of the reasons why 
the DEA remained so determined to continue pursuing the issue of Chinese recognition 
and the seating of the PRC was the opinions of Canada citizens.  Throughout the 1950s 
and the first half of the 1960s, the Canadian public had been coming to accept that the 
PRC was in control of China, and that the Communist government would not simply fall 
apart because the rest of the world ignored it. Additionally, the Canadian economy had 
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begun to expand and become stronger once trade was opened up with the PRC. The 
Canadian public realized that isolating the PRC from the rest of the world would not 
achieve anything, and that there was much to be gained from working with Peking. The 
combined force of these factors caused the attitude of the Canadian public towards the 
entry of the PRC into the United Nations to become more approving.  
 A Gallup Poll, conducted in April 1966, showed the dramatic increase in support 
by Canadians for the PRC’s entry into the United Nations. In 1956, before Canada 
concluded any of the large-scale wheat deals, only 28% of the Canadian public supported 
the entry of the PRC into the United Nations and 44% opposed it, with a further 28% 
having no opinion on the issue.220 After the first of the wheat deals was completed, the 
opinions of Canadians changed greatly, with many of the people who had previously 
expressed no opinion on the subject taking a side.  By 1961, 50% of Canadians polled 
believed that the PRC should be seated in the United Nations, and only 39% believed that 
they should not be, with 11% still expressing no opinion on the subject.221 The final year 
of the poll was 1966, and it saw the continuation of the trend of the previous two polls. In 
1966 the percentage of people who supported the PRC rose to 54%, while the percent that 
opposed seating Peking had fallen to 30%, with 16% having no opinion on the subject.222  
 The most interesting point found in the poll was not that the number of people 
favouring the measure had risen but that there was no one political party that favoured or 
opposed the measure.  By 1965, 59% of the people who supported the Progressive 
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Conservative Party believed that the PRC should be seated with only 29% opposing the 
idea. Support among members of the Liberal Party was not as high, with 52% of the party 
supporting the seating of the PRC and 33% opposing the idea.223  Support for the measure 
was strongest among the New Democratic Party (NDP), with 69% of the party showing 
support and 26% disapproving.224  
 The Canadian public supported the improvement of ties with Communist China 
and the Peking government also had good reasons to cultivate closer ties with Canada.  
Chief among these was the fact that Canada had become a major supplier of food to the 
PRC. The Chinese people did not know about the huge wheat deals taking place, but that 
did not lessen the need of the PRC to import vast amounts of food. The PRC would 
continue to complete wheat deals with Canada throughout the 1960s. On 25 October 
1965, the Canadian Wheat Board had announced that it had completed a new wheat deal 
with the PRC that would involved the sale of between 122 million and 186.7 million 
bushels of wheat before 31 July 1969. By November 1968, the PRC had actually bought 
235 million bushels.225 The continuation of the wheat deals showed that the PRC viewed 
Canada as a reliable external food source for its enormous population. 
 The issue that had always been foremost in the mind of Canadian officials when 
considering the issue of Chinese representation was the attitude of the United States. 
Beginning in 1966, however, the situation had begun to change, and it appeared that the 
willingness of the United States to resist any change regarding seating or recognizing the 
PRC was beginning to decline. One of the clearest indications that the United States was 
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considering changing its position was that “high-ranking American officials began to 
muse to their Canadian counterparts about the advisability of instituting a form of the 
two-China solution in the UN.”226 Canadian officials would learn of the changing 
attitudes of many officials within the United States government from February to 
September 1966.227  
 The list of officials who were expressing a more open attitude toward seating the 
PRC included Arthur Goldberg, the permanent United States representative to the United 
Nations, Averell Harriman, a United States ambassador at large, and Senators Edward 
Kennedy and George McGovern, among others.228 Believing that Canada was in a good 
position to make a move, and not wanting to let the opportunity slip away from him, 
Martin and the DEA began developing a plan around mid-1966 that they felt would allow 
them to make some headway in seating the PRC. The plan called for a proposal to be put 
forward before the General Assembly that would see the seating of both the PRC and the 
ROC in the United Nations until a permanent resolution to the dispute could be 
reached.229 The specifics involved allowing the PRC to represent China in the General 
Assembly, and as a member of the Security Council, while having the ROC government 
removed from the Security Council, though allowing them to remain in the General 
Assembly as a representative of Formosa (Taiwan).230 Various countries had proposed 
different versions of the same plan since the end of the Chinese Civil War, but none had 
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ever received very much support, especially from the PRC and the ROC. In the event that 
Martin’s proposal failed, the DEA decided that Canada would abstain from voting for the 
Albanian resolution.231  
 At the twenty-first meeting of the General Assembly, a draft of the Albanian 
resolution was submitted on 16 November 1966, by eleven nations, Canada not among 
them.232 When speaking in favour of the Albanian resolution, the delegates reiterated 
several points that had been made in previous years to justify their position.  One of the 
reasons given was that the PRC had been in control of China, with the exception of 
Taiwan, for a long time giving it alone the right to claim to represent the Chinese people. 
Another reason given was that the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations was 
greatly reduced because of the absence of the representatives of one quarter of the 
world’s population. The argument that may have had the most significance was that it 
would be impossible for any disarmament measures to be implemented with any 
measurable effect, without the involvement of the PRC, as it had now become a nuclear 
power. 
 Martin had decided now was the time to try and get the PRC into the United 
Nations because the changing attitude of the United States presented an opportunity that 
Canada did not have before. When the United Nations General Assembly met, however, 
DEA officials realized that they had badly misinterpreted the attitude of the United States 
as it remained as determined as ever to keep the PRC out of the United Nations. The 
attitudes of many officials within Washington were beginning to soften, but the United 
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States government itself felt that allowing the PRC to enter into the United Nations, even 
if it was with the ROC would not be acceptable at that time. Washington’s reasoning for 
opposing the seating of the PRC was that its officials felt that it might “encourage 
hardline tendencies in Peking, adversely affect peace prospects in Viet Nam, and create 
many problems for allies in Asia.”233   
 The United States championed the cause of keeping the PRC out of the United 
Nations, but it also had the support of other prominent nations such as Japan.234 Some of 
the arguments against the entrance of the PRC into the United Nations were the same as 
previous Assemblies. One of the new arguments used by the PRC’s opponents was that 
the PRC “had posed conditions for entry into the United Nations which made it clear that 
its real desire was not to co-operate in the work of the Organization but to wreck it.”235 
The argument clearly refers back to the comments made by PRC Foreign Minister Chen 
the previous year. The fundamental argument of the PRC’s opponents was that to vote for 
the seating of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations would be “to abet 
aggression, negate the basic principles of the Charter and undercut the claim of the 
United Nations to being a moral force in the world.”236 
  Despite the arguments made against seating the PRC, the DEA still believed that 
it would be possible to seat the PRC at this meeting of the General Assembly, but things 
went wrong for Martin and his plan. The DEA had no one to blame but themselves for 
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the failure of their efforts, as the view from outside Washington saw the stance of the 
United States softening; however, this was not the case, as the United States used its 
influence to draw support away from Martin’s proposal. The United States threw its 
support behind a resolution put forward by six nations including Italy, Brazil, and 
Belgium. The resolution called for the General Assembly to: 
 Decide to establish a committee of Member States (number unspecified) to be 
 appointed by the General Assembly, with the mandate of exploring and studying 
 the situation in all its aspects in order to make the appropriate recommendations 
 to the General Assembly at its twenty-second (1967) session for an equitable and 
 practical solution to the question of the representation of China in the United 
 Nations, in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter.237 
 
 The United States did not like the idea of a committee examining the issue of 
Chinese representation saying that “We do not like it and we know that it is an 
annoyance” to the ROC, but it was necessary.238  
 One of the most interesting facts about the six-power resolution was that the ROC 
had threatened to withdraw from the United Nations if it was passed.239 The ROC saw the 
resolution and Canada’s proposal as being attempts “obviously designed to pave the way 
for the eventual admission of Peiping.”240  The truth was that the United States was 
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supporting the resolution only because it wanted to “cut the ground from under the 
Canadian resolution, which represented a new danger this year.”241  
 With the United States throwing its support behind the six-power resolution, 
Martin’s proposal did not find the support needed to be put before the General Assembly. 
Martin had attempted to have parts of his proposal put into the six-power resolution, 
specifically the idea of having two Chinas being represented in the General Assembly, 
but the United States had managed to block his efforts, effectively ending Martin’s 
attempt bring his proposal into the United Nations.242  The six-power resolution was 
essentially an attempt to put off the issue of Chinese representation for another year. As 
in previous years the Assembly had decided that the Albanian resolution would require a 
two-thirds majority to pass, and a motion was made by the Syrian delegation to see the 
six-power resolution also require a two-thirds majority.243 The Syrian motion was passed 
with a vote of 51 to 37, with 30 abstentions, but it was not necessary, as the Assembly 
rejected the six-power resolution by a vote of 34 to 62, with 25 abstentions.244  
 When the Canadian delegation spoke to the Assembly, the speaker, George 
Ignatieff, said that while Canada did support the six-power resolution, he also stated his 
belief that the resolution was lacking in specific directives.245 It was at this time that the 
plan that Martin had developed was announced to the Assembly. Though it had never 
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been officially made public many different governments had already known about 
Martin’s proposal as he had been attempting to gain support for it, prior to the vote. As 
opposed to the six-power resolution, Martin’s plan was put forward as an alternate way to 
solve the problem of Chinese representation for the moment. The Canadian delegation 
made mention of Martin’s proposal, but it was not officially proposed to the Assembly 
for a vote as it had become clear that too many powers opposed it.  
 The Assembly was told that both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic 
of China could participate in the Assembly as the representatives of the areas they 
controlled, though the People’s Republic would be given the China seat on the Security 
Council.246 Unfortunately, Martin’s idea to try and create “two Chinas,” was rejected for 
the very reason that Martin thought it could work. The United States opposed Martin’s 
proposal because it would give the impression that there were two Chinese governments 
while the United States remained a firm advocate, along with the ROC, that there was 
only one, the Republic of China.   
 With all hope of seeing his new breakthrough proposal fail, Martin was left with 
no choice but to abstain on the Albanian resolution.247  By abstaining, Martin caused 
Canada’s China policy to move forward for the first time, with the exception of unofficial 
contacts, since the PRC was founded in 1949, because for the first time, Canada had not 
voted as the United States had on the issue.248 In a report from David H. Popper, the U.S. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the most 
striking point of the meeting of the General Assembly was identified as “Canada’s 
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decision to abstain on the Albanian resolution” while still voting for the Important 
Question and six-power resolution.249  Whereas it could be argued that during the 
twentieth meeting of the General Assembly Canada’s vote had some importance, as it had 
helped create a tie that stopped the PRC from winning a symbolic, but important victory, 
it made no difference during the current vote.  
 The Albanian resolution was rejected with 57 votes against, 46 in favour, and 17 
abstentions.250 The reason that the Albanian resolution was rejected was that the United 
States had agreed to support the six-power resolution if other nations who were wavering 
agreed to vote against the Albanian resolution and for the Important Question 
resolution.251 The United States strategy gave the impression that they were considering 
new options, in order to shore up a majority of support that they felt was becoming 
unstable.252 The day after the vote was held, Martin had lunch with the United States 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and was told by Rusk that he “understood why, in the 
crunch, we must make decision as we saw fit.”253 
Canada’s return to Recognition Strategies, 1967-1968 
 
 When Canada chose to abstain on the Albanian resolution it believed that the 
response from the United States would be severe, given the way that the United States 
had reacted previously to Canada’s efforts to seat the PRC. But the United States 
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surprised officials in the DEA, as the retaliation that they had been anticipating never 
came.254  The policies of the United States had been challenged by its allies in the past, 
but the issue of recognizing the PRC was one that had met with resistance for almost 
twenty years. In that time, many of the United States’ allies had simply abandoned the 
policy altogether. Britain and France, two of the United States most important allies, had 
already recognized the PRC as the official government of China, and Canada had long 
been indicating that it would like to follow the same course of action. 
  It would not have been unreasonable for the United States to believe that Canada, 
being unable to make any kind of progress in the United Nations, would favour a simple 
bilateral recognition of the PRC.255 In 1966, prior to the twenty-first meeting of the 
United Nations General Assembly, Martin had publicly suggested that if Canada could 
not make progress through the United Nations, Canada might have no choice other than 
to recognize the PRC on its own. 256 Though Martin made the statement, it was not 
confirmed as policy at the time. The United States was concerned about the possibility of 
Canadian recognition of the PRC because it would have far less control over the situation 
than it had in the United Nations debates.  
 The concerns of the United States were well founded, because bilateral 
recognition was the course of action that Martin and his colleagues in the DEA were 
considering. The DEA had come to the conclusion that bilateral recognition would be the 
best option for them to make any headway in their quest to advance relations with the 
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PRC.257 The United States learned of Canada’s return to the issue of recognizing the PRC 
on its own in December 1966; however, the Canadian government was slow to make any 
move of significance.258  
 The reason that Canada was slow to move forward with the idea of recognition 
was because while the DEA wanted to move forward with it, others did not believe that it 
was a good idea. After the twenty-first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 
Martin decided that recognition was the best way forward and began to seek the opinions 
of other Canadian officials regarding recognition. Ralph Collins, who had been appointed 
by Martin to the DEA’s China study group, had believed that it would not be possible to 
recognize the PRC unless Canada was willing to abandon Taiwan.259 Collins found it 
unlikely that other members of the Canadian government would be willing to abandon 
Taiwan at the current time, but he also urged Martin to “seek immediate cabinet approval 
to consider the question of recognition.”260  
 Collins had been correct, however, and Martin found little support within other 
areas of the government. A member of Cabinet, Arthur Laing, who served as the Minister 
of Northern Affairs and National Resources until 30 September 1966 when the position 
was changed and he became the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
had not been pleased with Martin’s decision to abstain on the Albanian resolution.261 
Pearson was weary of pushing the United States too far regarding Canada’s relations with 
the PRC, and with a member of his own Cabinet opposing the direction that Canada’s 
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foreign policy was taking the situation did not bode well for Pearson taking a bold stance 
on Canada-China relations. In the end, the pressure from other members of the Canadian 
government convinced Martin to hold off on the issue of recognition.262 Martin would not 
approach the issue until the Cultural Revolution broke out in Mainland China, at which 
time the situation in China had become highly unstable. The instability of the PRC 
caused Martin to reverse his previous statements and he recommended to Cabinet that 
Canada “undertake no negotiations for the present,” which Cabinet accepted.263 
 The Cultural Revolution breaking out in 1967 caused Canada to change its 
position regarding the PRC, as the actions taking place in Mainland China could not be 
justified by the Canadian government. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was an 
attempt by Mao to bring about a state of “revolutionary purity in a post revolutionary 
age.”264 The reason that the Cultural Revolution worsened relations between the PRC and 
the Western World was not the result of the hard-line communist origins of the 
revolution; rather it was the result of the vigilante style actions and attitude of the 
members of the Red Guard. The Cultural Revolution turned the major cities of Mainland 
China into areas of chaos and anarchy, and undermined the idea that the PRC was in 
control of the country, as the Red Guard, which consisted of millions of young people 
who were mobilized to combat “revisionism” inside of the Chinese Communist Party, 
targeted many government leaders, short of Mao himself.265 The end result was the total 
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collapse of the political institutions inside many of the most important cities in Mainland 
China.266 People living in Canada became aware of the things going on in Mainland 
China, which in turn made it difficult for the Canadian government to follow through 
with its plans and desires to recognize the PRC as the official government of China.   
 With the Canadian public learning of the chaos taking place in Mainland China, 
and the political situation being so unstable, the Pearson government found itself in a 
position where it would be impossible to justify giving recognition to the PRC.  Canada’s 
argument for recognizing and seating the PRC had been that it was in control of 
Mainland China, and had established a working government that had effective control 
over the area it claimed with the exception of Taiwan. Now the Cultural Revolution had 
made it appear as though that was no longer true. In a press conference, Prime Minister 
Pearson said that it was difficult to get accurate information about the conditions in 
Mainland China as well as saying that “some areas appeared to be approaching chaos and 
anarchy.”267  
 Even Paul Martin, who had been a strong supporter of recognizing the PRC, had 
been quoted as saying “the situation does not make it desirable to revert to these 
proposals at this time.”268 In his statement, Martin was referring to comments he had 
made the previous year, when he stated that if Canada could not achieve success in the 
United Nations then it would move forward with recognition on its own. The chaos in 
Mainland China that had resulted from the Cultural Revolution had put an end to any 
immediate hopes that Canadian officials may have had for recognizing the PRC. 
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 The destabilization of the political system within the PRC also made it very 
difficult for the DEA to predict how the PRC would react, even if Canada did extend 
recognition to it. The Canadian government had often feared what a rejection of its effort 
to recognize the PRC would do to the government’s reputation, and did not want to risk 
the humiliation of being rejected when the situation within the PRC was so chaotic. The 
fear within the Canadian government, and the unpredictable nature of the PRC, 
effectively put all attempts at recognition by the Canadian government on hold.269 The 
government’s study regarding possible ways to recognize the PRC in the future was also 
halted. 270 The government’s actions show that it was not a momentary stop to the issue of 
recognizing the PRC, but a complete suspension on the part of the Canadian government, 
for the foreseeable future. The Canadian government did not return to the United Nations 
strategy, but returned to Pearson’s original position of taking no action at all.  
 Though Canada had chosen to halt its efforts at building closer relations with the 
PRC, it still had a decision to make at the meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1967. Several nations spoke during the debate in the General Assembly in 
support of the admittance of the PRC into the United Nations. Among the speakers were 
representatives for Cambodia, the United Kingdom, and the USSR.271 Those who 
supported the seating of the PRC reiterated several of the points that had been made in 
previous years. The arguments included that the PRC had effective control over Mainland 
China, in order to achieve universal representation the PRC would have to be admitted, 
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and it would be impossible to conclude a disarmament treaty without the PRC. They also 
argued that the ROC was “no more than a rump regime artificially maintained by the 
presence of United States military forces on the island of Taiwan.”272  
 Those who opposed the seating of the PRC were led by the United States, and 
used many of the arguments that they had used in the past. The Canadian representatives 
once again talked about their plan to have both the PRC and the ROC represented in the 
General Assembly as an interim solution to the representation problem. Other nations, 
while not mentioning Canada or its proposal, had made similar declarations. The 
representatives of Ghana and Japan had made known their desire to see Taiwan remain in 
the United Nations, even if the PRC was given China’s seat. The representative of Ghana 
expressing the opinion that “the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic 
of China should not prejudice the claim of Taiwan as a member of the international 
community.”273  
 While having both Chinese governments included in the United Nations may have 
been the best chance that the ROC had for maintaining a place in the United Nations, the 
ROC did not agree. The Taiwanese representative indicated that “there was only one 
China and one legal Chinese Government – the Government of the Republic of China.” 
He went on to say that “he categorically rejected any proposal that purported to resolve 
the question of representation through the ‘two-Chinas’ formula.”274 When the vote took 
place, Canada chose to continue with the decisions that it had made the previous year and 
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abstained from voting for the Albanian resolution.275 The Albanian resolution was 
rejected, with the final tally being 58 against the resolution, 45 in favour of it, and 17 
abstaining from the vote.276 The year 1967 appeared early on to be the ideal time to 
recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China, but the Cultural Revolution 
robbed Canada of the opportunity. It became a year where the issue of recognition took a 
large step back, and any hope of achieving recognition seemed to disappear for the 
foreseeable future.  
  The Cultural Revolution would mark the end of Prime Minister Lester Pearson’s 
contribution to relations between the PRC and Canada, as no action of any consequence 
would be undertaken for the remainder of Pearson’s term in office. The Cultural 
Revolution had rendered the issue dead for the moment, and without knowing how long 
the chaos that the revolution had caused in Mainland China would last, officials in the 
Pearson government had to look to more immediate issues. Two elections were to take 
place in 1968, the first being to decide the new leader of the Liberal Party, as Lester 
Pearson had decided to leave the office of Prime Minister. The second election would be 
a federal election to see who would become the new Prime Minister of Canada. The 
result of the first election was that Pierre Elliot Trudeau replaced Pearson, as leader of the 
Liberal Party. The second election would see the Liberal Party maintain control of the 
House of Commons with Trudeau becoming Prime Minister. 
Conclusion 
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 Lester Pearson’s term of office as Prime Minister of Canada saw several attempts 
on the part of Canadian officials to both recognize and seat the PRC, but in each instance 
an unexpected event took place that changed the situation. The end result of Martin’s and 
the Department of External Affairs’ efforts during Pearson’s term in office was that the 
Canadian government failed to make the breakthrough of actually recognizing the PRC, 
or being able to find a way to seat them in the United Nations. The Pearson government 
made several valiant attempts; however, like previous efforts, opposition from the United 
States or an unexpected event, such as the Cultural Revolution, robbed Canada of the 
opportunity to take the final step.   
 Pearson and the officials within the DEA attempted almost every course of action 
open to them to see a breakthrough in relations between the PRC and Canada, but none 
succeeded. Whenever they put a new plan into motion circumstances changed and their 
plans were ruined. They made progress, but they did not make enough. Pearson’s lack of 
success can be attributed to his belief that there was no compelling reason to recognize 
the PRC as he was able to increase trade between Canada and the PRC without Canada 
recognizing the PRC as the official government of China. With no compelling reason in 
mind Pearson did not display the determination that would be necessary to achieve what 
had been viewed as unachievable for also two decades. Though not all his officials 
believed the same thing. 
 Paul Martin, and other members of the DEA, saw how bringing the PRC into the 
United Nations at that time would help to stabilize the organization as it was inevitable 
that the PRC would gain entrance, and they could minimize the damage to the prestige of 
the United States and the ROC by acting now. Furthermore, Martin saw the value of 
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displaying the independence of Canadian foreign policy by acting before the United 
States, which could damage Canada’s credibility among foreign powers. Though the 
Liberal Party would win the next federal election, with an increase in the number of seats 
that they controlled, Pearson would not be the leader of the Party. Pierre Elliot Trudeau 
would succeed Pearson, and he would be the man to achieve a goal that had been part of 
Canadian foreign policy for over twenty years.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Final Breakthrough:  
Trudeau and the Final Step, 1968-1971 
 
 Prime Minister Lester Pearson tried many different approaches during his time in 
office to achieve the goal of recognizing the PRC, but his efforts met with failure. The 
duty now fell to a new government under Pierre Elliot Trudeau. During the term of the 
Trudeau government an issue that had been facing Canadian foreign policy makers for 
over two decades would finally be solved. The process, though, would be as difficult as 
ever. After taking office Trudeau would move quickly to establish a new China policy for 
Canada, in order to see the Canadian government achieve its long held goal of 
recognizing the PRC as the official government of China. Once the preparations were 
complete, the Canadian government would approach the PRC to begin the negotiation 
process to open official relations between the two governments; however, the 
negotiations would prove far more difficult then originally anticipated. The final aspect 
would involve the entrance of the PRC into the United Nations. Though Canada did not 
directly play a major role in the PRC’s admittance, Canadian officials took a stand 
against the China policy of the United States and the efforts of Canadian officials could 
be seen, indirectly, on both sides of the debate. 
The Trudeau Initiative, 1968-1969 
 
 Trudeau was not like the Prime Ministers who had preceded him, many of whom 
had been mistrustful of the PRC government; he actively embraced the PRC’s control of 
Mainland China. Trudeau had visited China before he was elected as Prime Minister. He 
had visited China in 1949 just as the Chinese Civil War was ending with a Communist 
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victory.277 During his 1949 visit to China, “At the edge of chaos and conflict, he saw a 
society and a polity in the throes of death.”278 Trudeau had also “made a memorable 
visit” to Mainland China in 1960 at a time that the Great Leap Forward was taking 
place.279 His trips to China were experiences that made Trudeau a more informed leader 
then the previous Canadian prime ministers, because he had actually been to Mainland 
China during some of the greatest developments that had taken place there, since the end 
of the Chinese Civil War.  
 There were also political matters that reinforced Trudeau’s belief that Canada 
should recognize the PRC. Trudeau made mention of his political reasons when he was 
speaking in Vancouver on 10 March 1968.280 He stated that for Mainland China, which 
housed a quarter of the world’s population, to remain “diplomatically isolated even from 
countries with which it is actively trading is obviously unsatisfactory.”281 He had 
promised that during his term in office, the Canadian government would recognize the 
PRC, and he wasted no time in fulfilling that promise.  In the weeks after Trudeau had 
been elected the leader of the Liberal party, he had approached the DEA asking them to 
reopen the “consideration of Canadian China policy” that had been halted as a result of 
the Cultural Revolution.282  Despite the fact that Trudeau had decided to proceed with the 
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recognition of the PRC as the official government of China, the actual implementation of 
recognizing the PRC was still a complex issue.  
 There were three governments that factored into the formulation of Canada’s 
recognition process: the United States, the PRC and the ROC on Taiwan. Both the PRC 
and the ROC believed themselves to be the sole legitimate government of China, and the 
United States had been a fierce ally of the ROC against the PRC.  In order for Canada to 
achieve the recognition of the PRC, some form of compromise had to be reached between 
the two sides. The problem that had always prevented the Canadian government from 
taking the final step towards recognition was that no side had left any middle ground that 
could be navigated, making it impossible for a third party to make any sort of move 
without offending the other side. The unwillingness of both sides to compromise had 
made it impossible for Canada to achieve its goals. That changed in 1968, when the 
United States indicated that it was willing to become more flexible on its position 
regarding recognition of the PRC.  
 The United States policy about not recognizing the PRC as the legitimate 
government of China was crumbling, with more of its allies choosing to recognize the 
PRC. The United States came to fear exactly what Paul Martin had expressed during his 
time as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Lester Pearson. Martin had feared that if the 
United States continued to ignore the PRC, then the PRC would eventually gain access to 
the United Nations and recognition from the rest of the world, but both would be on the 
PRC’s terms. Martin’s view was considered unacceptable, as it would entail other nations 
recognizing the PRC to have authority over Taiwan and would also be a severe loss of 
face for the United States and its allies, who were continuing to resist the PRC’s attempts 
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to be recognized. The United States was coming to accept that the ROC could not reclaim 
control of the Chinese Mainland, which meant that in order to avoid the worst-case 
scenario from coming true it would need to adjust its China policy as it had in the past.283  
 The Canadian government came to realize that if it could “find a way to recognize 
the PRC without affirming Beijing’s claim to Taiwan, and ideally also without breaking 
relations with Taipei,” then the United States would not interfere as they had in the 
past.284 The United States had often said that it was willing to become more flexible with 
its policy towards the PRC; however, when the time came they would usually change 
their minds, frustrating Canadian efforts. This was clearly highlighted in 1966 when the 
DEA misread the attitude of the United States and proposed a plan to seat the PRC in the 
United Nations, only to see the plan fail when the United States threw its support behind 
an opposing plan.  
 Despite the constant shifting of the United States’ position, Trudeau and the DEA 
were determined to recognize the PRC. Their determination was what caused the DEA to 
take advantage of the new opening that was being presented. In a meeting between the 
Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Albert Edgar Ritchie, and the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, which took place on 10 June 
1968, Bundy implied that “if Canada could find a way to recognize the PRC without 
affirming Beijing’s claim to Taiwan, and ideally also without breaking relations with 
Taipei, Washington would not object to recognition.”285 Before that meeting the United 
States had never given a specific account of what would have to be achieved for it to 
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withhold its objections. It was also the middle ground that the DEA had been waiting to 
take advantage of. 286  
 John Diefenbaker had been the first prime minister to take advantage of the 
economic potential of the PRC. The other prime ministers who had to deal with the issue 
of recognition since the administration of St. Laurent had lacked the same determination 
to achieve a specific goal. With the exception of Diefenbaker’s desire to open economic 
relations with the PRC, the other prime ministers had viewed the risks of dealing with the 
PRC to not be worth the potential gain. Trudeau saw the benefits of recognizing the PRC 
as being well worth the risks, especially with the United States saying that it would not 
object if Canada could meet the condition of recognizing the PRC, without recognizing 
the PRC’s claim to Taiwan. He pursued the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two governments with the same kind of determination that Diefenbaker had 
shown when he was attempting to open trade between Canada and the PRC.  
 Trudeau was a realist who was under no misconceptions about the capabilities or 
strength of Canada, and his beliefs can be seen in his desire to improve relations with the 
PRC. When Trudeau visited Mainland China in 1973 he explained what had drove him to 
open relations with the PRC during a banquet he was attending, along with many of the 
top politicians and officials within the PRC. The headline of an article reporting on 
Trudeau’s visit to China captures Trudeau’s sentiment perfectly: “Trudeau in China: 
We’re weak so we must earn your respect.” Trudeau was blunt when speaking about the 
capabilities of Canada stating that “Canada peacefully must earn the respect of other 
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countries because it is incapable of forcing them to respect even its independence.”287  It 
was the simple truth about Canada’s capabilities that pushed Trudeau to embrace the 
issue of recognition. Recognition would help to stabilize the international situation, and, 
in his view, that was important to Canadian security, because it was incapable of 
embracing any other form of security.  
 Advancing Canadian security by stabilizing the international situation was an idea 
that was shared by other members of the Canadian government, most prominently in the 
DEA. The need to open relations with the PRC extended beyond the issue of maintaining 
peace within the international community as there were other more practical reasons for 
the PRC to have an effect on Canadian security.  The DEA had long believed that there 
could be “no lasting peace or stability in the Pacific or in the world without the 
cooperation and participation of China.”288 The PRC had become a major power in the 
Pacific. With Canada’s western coast on the Pacific, a direct link had been created 
between security along Canada’s western coast and the PRC. Some Canadian officials 
even viewed the opening of relations with the PRC as being as important to Canadian 
security in the Pacific as Canadian membership in NATO was to its security in the 
Atlantic.289 With no official communication channels open between Canada and the PRC, 
any future problems in the Pacific would be that much harder to address and manage.  
 Trudeau characterized the goals of Canadian foreign policy as being to “avoid 
tension, to strengthen institutions of international co-operation and assist the development 
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of newly independent countries.”290 Since the United Nations was formed after World 
War II, Canadian prime ministers had sought ways to improve and strengthen the 
organization, because it embodied all the traits that Trudeau said Canadian foreign policy 
sought to achieve. Furthermore, Trudeau believed that “in the nuclear age, all possible 
effort should be made to break down the differences between the East and the West,” a 
sentiment that was shared by many intellectuals at the time.291 One of the reasons that 
Trudeau was interested in tearing down the barriers between East and West was because 
he was not afraid of Chinese aggression occurring during “his own lifetime”, as the PRC 
had too much work to accomplish internally and it did not have a history of aggressive 
behaviour, unlike the West.292  
 With the United States having withdrawn its objections, Trudeau believed that 
now the time was right to open relations with a government representing a nation of vast 
potential to further ensure Canadian security. Though many world leaders saw the PRC 
as being a nation that was unstable due to the Cultural Revolution that had recently taken 
place, Trudeau was not one of them. Regardless of the political situation that was taking 
place in Mainland China Trudeau could see that “China was forming the base for a strong 
industrial society.”293 Furthermore Trudeau, as he had seen China before and after the 
rise of the PRC, knew that the Chinese people had more faith in the Communist regime 
than “they had had in the ramshackle and corrupt quasi-democracy of 1949.”294  
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 Trudeau’s desire to see Canada recognize the PRC went beyond the issue of 
advancing Canadian foreign policy by establishing relations with other governments. He 
can be shown to have an actual admiration for what the PRC government had achieved in 
Mainland China. The most prominent Communist regimes during the 1960s were the 
Soviet Union, the PRC, and Cuba. Trudeau was aware that these governments had 
limitations placed on the civic rights of their peoples, but he felt that they should be given 
credit for the social achievements that they had accomplished.295 Trudeau’s attitude can 
be seen in his critique of an article by George Grant, the well-known Canadian political 
philosopher.296 Grant had argued that “social priorities were ‘more advanced’ in North 
America than in the Soviet Union”; however, Trudeau rejected Grant’s argument 
believing that “there were too many cars in garages and not enough classrooms.”297 
Trudeau did not believe that the Communist governments were perfect, but he felt that 
they should be given credit for their accomplishments. Trudeau had visited China 
multiple times and saw the progress that had been made by the PRC, and he was 
impressed by what they had done. During his 1973 visit he praised the “genius of 
Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Chou En-lai in mobilizing the Chinese people” and 
the “success of the social experiment they have conducted since seizing power in 
1949.”298 Trudeau embraced the PRC in ways that other Canadian officials never had, 
praising their efforts instead of condemning them. 
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 Trudeau had many political reasons for believing that Canada should have closer 
ties to the PRC, but some of his enthusiasm can be attributed to his own personality. In 
Volume I of his biography of Trudeau, John English explains how Trudeau often went 
against the conventional view.299 Prior to his being elected, as well as during his time in 
office, “stern anti-Communism was the dominant political current in North America.”300  
A Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union would characterize Trudeau’s nature as 
being “anti-establishment” and “the Soviets were never the establishment – even on the 
left.”301 
 Trudeau was sympathetic towards the PRC and sought to increase ties with them, 
but he was not naïve, and knew that as much as he wanted things with the PRC to go 
well, he could not afford to alienate the United States. How the reality of Canada’s 
situation tempered Trudeau’s desire for improving relations with the PRC can be seen in 
the actions taken during the 1968 meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. 
During the twenty-third session of the organization, Canada voted in favour of the 
Important Question resolution, and abstained in the vote for the Albanian resolution, 
which was how it had voted in 1967 before Trudeau became Prime Minister.302 Trudeau 
badly wanted to recognize the PRC and bring it out of isolation, but he knew that it would 
take time, no matter how much he wanted to achieve his goals.  
 With the idea of recognition being examined, it was important for the officials 
involved to identify the issues that would be most important to the negotiation process, as 
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well as the issues that could potentially harm Canadian interests. Four main issues were 
identified that were most important to the interests of Canada: the reaction of the United 
States, the issue of Taiwan, the possible effects on Canada’s wheat sales, and “the 
exchange of trade offices as an alternative to diplomatic relations.”303 These four issues 
would be foremost in the minds of Canadian officials as they moved to open negotiations 
with the PRC. For almost two decades the DEA had wanted to recognize the PRC as the 
official government of China.  Now, the Department had its chance, but it would prove 
more difficult than originally thought. 
Recognition at Last, 1969-1970 
 
 The first step in beginning the recognition process was letting the PRC know that 
Canada was willing to now sit down and negotiate an agreement that both sides would 
find acceptable. As Canada had not recognized the PRC, it did not have a representative 
located within Mainland China, nor did the PRC have a representative in Canada.  Since 
neither government had a representative in direct contact with its opposite, it was 
necessary for the Canadian representative to a third nation, which also had a 
representative from the PRC, to make the initial proposal. It was decided that the 
Canadian Ambassador in Stockholm, Sweden, would approach the PRC Embassy to 
make the first contact.304  The Ambassador would “propose talks at a mutually 
convenient time between Chinese and Canadian representatives with a view to establish 
diplomatic relations and exchanging diplomatic missions.”305  Arthur Andrew, the 
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Canadian Ambassador to Sweden, was instructed on 30 January 1969 to approach his 
Chinese opposite and suggest that a dialogue be opened between the two governments 
over the issue of recognition.306  
 Minister of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp announced Canada’s attempt to open 
negotiations with the PRC to the House of Commons on 10 February 1969.307 When the 
announcement was made, many members of other parties spoke out in favour of what 
Sharp and the DEA were doing. Gordon Fairweather, a Progressive Conservative 
member, and Stanley Knowles, a New Democratic Party member, both supported the 
government’s actions.308  Fairweather, in addition to supporting the government’s 
actions, also stated that he “hoped that Communist China can soon take its place as a 
member of the United Nations,” as Fairweather was a believer in universality within the 
United Nations.309 Knowles also stated his party’s support of Fairweather’s hope that the 
PRC would soon be seated in the United Nations.310  Though they may have had different 
reasons for supporting the issue of recognition or the seating of the PRC in the United 
Nations, members of the three main Canadian political parties agreed that it was time to 
move forward with Canada’s China policy. With members of the opposition speaking out 
in the House of Commons in favour of the government’s efforts to establish relations 
with the PRC, the threat of domestic backlash against the government for attempting 
recognition would be minimal. 
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 Both Canada and the PRC wanted to open formal relations with one another, but 
that was not a simple matter. In order for an agreement to be reached, both sides had to 
reach a compromise that they both found acceptable. Finding a compromise would prove 
to be a problem, as the PRC stood firm on its demand that Canada recognize its claim to 
all Chinese territory, including Taiwan. Canada, however, could not abandon Taiwan to 
the PRC without incurring the wrath of the United States. The United States had shown 
far more flexibility during the current attempt at recognition by the Canadian government 
than it had in past attempts, but that did not mean that it was willing to abandon Taiwan. 
In discussions that had been conducted between Canada’s Ambassador to the United 
States and officials from the Department of State, the Department had not “expressed any 
protest or serious misgivings about Canada’s intention to open negotiations with 
China.”311 The position of the United States regarding Taiwan, however, was no secret, 
and the Canadian government was sure to take notice. It had pushed time and again to be 
able to open negotiations with the PRC, but when the opportunity finally came, they were 
prepared to pull out of the negotiations if the PRC pushed too hard on matters that the 
United States viewed as important.  
 When Andrew approached the PRC embassy in Stockholm he had been instructed 
“not to raise the question of Taiwan.”312  If the PRC officials demanded that Canada 
publicly declare that Taiwan was within the jurisdiction of the PRC and discredit the 
claim of the ROC over Taiwan, then Andrew was to refuse their request, “even at the cost 
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of suspending negotiations with Peking.”313 From the instructions that Andrew received, 
it is clear that Ottawa was not willing to go farther than the United States would be 
comfortable with, but at the same time, the Canadian officials knew of the vast potential 
that China presented.  
 The Canadian government had never believed that it would be possible or wise to 
proceed with its plans unless the United States was kept informed of the ongoing process. 
Part of the plan for opening relations with the PRC involved the Canadian Ambassador in 
Washington informing the United States government almost immediately once Cabinet 
had approved its plan to approach the PRC Embassy in Sweden.314 Ambassador Ritchie 
informed the State Department the day after the Cabinet had approved its plans to 
approach the PRC in Sweden.315  Once the United States government was informed of 
Canada’s intentions, Washington once again began to exert pressure on the Canadian 
government to ensure any agreement would be one that was also acceptable to the United 
States.316 Given the importance of the United States co-operation to the success of 
Canadian foreign policy, and the continuation of Canadian security, it would be 
impossible for Canada to risk opening a rift between the two governments. Canada 
needed to find a solution that would be acceptable to both sides, which wanted opposite 
outcomes.  
 At the meeting between Andrew and the PRC chargé d'affaires, Liu Zhizai, 
Andrew stated that the Canadian government would like to have representatives from 
both governments meet at “a convenient time and place, to discuss mutual recognition 
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and an exchange of ambassadors.”317 Liu stated that he was taking the offer by the 
Canadian government very seriously; however, there would be “three constant 
principles” that the PRC would insist on for an agreement to be reached.  First, Canada 
would have to “recognize the central People’s Republic as the sole and lawful 
government of the Chinese people.”318 Second, Canada would have to recognize that 
“Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory” and by extension Canada would have 
to sever its ties with the Kai-shek (ROC) government.319 Third, Canada would need to 
“give support to the restoration of the rightful place and legitimate right in the United 
Nations of the PRC, and no longer give any backing to so-called representative of Chiang 
Kai-shek in any organ of this international body.”320  
 The first and third principles were not points of contention, but the second 
principle was much more complicated, as Canada could not accept the PRC’s claim to 
Taiwan. However, Canada would have been willing to accept the part of the second 
principle that stated that Canada would have to sever ties to the Taiwan government, as it 
was likely that relations would have been severed anyway. Additionally, Prime Minister 
Trudeau was not fond of Chiang. Trudeau considered Chiang’s government to be a harsh 
dictatorship and viewed its policies to be highly influenced by capitalist principles.321  
 Even though Trudeau was not friendly towards the Taiwan government, the fact 
remained that the United States would find it unacceptable if Canada stated that Taiwan 
was under the jurisdiction of the PRC. Canada could not accept the principles as they 
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were, but Canadian officials had been expecting that it would be “a slow and difficult 
process” and were determined to reach some sort of accommodation with the PRC.322 
Canadian officials chose to view the principles as the desires that the PRC wanted to 
achieve as opposed to actual conditions that Canada would have to meet before 
negotiations could proceed.323  
 Canadian officials appear to have been right in their assumptions, as the Canadian 
government was contacted by the PRC to make arrangements for a second meeting to 
continue negotiations. On 3 April, the PRC arrived at the Canadian embassy in 
Stockholm and suggested that the negotiations between the two sides begin as soon as 
possible. At the same meeting, the two sides agreed that the meetings between both 
governments would take place in Stockholm, that “English would be the official language 
of these discussions,” and that the negotiator for the PRC would be the “head of Chinese 
mission in Stockholm.”324 Even though the PRC had shown a desire to move forward 
with the negotiations, the process was anything but simple, and negotiations dragged on 
longer than expected.  
 The negotiations would take twenty months to complete and during that time the 
two sides would meet eighteen times in Stockholm.325 On 20 May, the two sides met, the 
fourth meeting to take place during the process, and sought to address the issues that both 
sides viewed as important.326 Canada wanted to focus on more practical issues, such as 
consular rights, outstanding debts from the Chinese Civil War, and more permanent trade 
                                                
322 LAC, RG 25 vol. 10840 file 20-1-2 PRC vol. 12, “Statements Regarding the 
Government’s Reasons for Recognizing the People’s Republic of China”, 1. 
323 Frolic, “The Trudeau Initiative”, 200. 
324 Ibid., 202. 
325 Graham, “A Colossus and a Conundrum”, 242. 
326 Frolic, “The Trudeau Initiative”, 203. 
 120 
agreements.327 The PRC wanted the issue of the “three constant principles” to be 
addressed before practical issues were looked at, particularly the issue of Taiwan.328 At 
the sixth meeting between the two sides, occurring on 10 July, the PRC had replaced their 
lead negotiator with Ambassador Wang Tung, who had recently arrived from China.329 
The issues that had been discussed in May had still not been resolved, and they carried 
over into the July meeting, with the PRC once again demanding that Canada “recognize 
Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory.”330  
 At the meeting previous to the July meeting, Canada had made the statement that 
it did not challenge the PRC’s claim to Taiwan, but at the same time Canada did not 
support it diplomatically either. The PRC found Canada’s position to be unacceptable and 
argued against it at both meetings, making it the dominant issue that was stalling the 
negotiating process, though they did appear open to meeting at a later date. The PRC had 
indicated that they were open to the idea of meeting again to continue negotiations; 
however, the prospects of the negotiations being successful were not promising. In order 
to stop the talks from collapsing, the Canadian side decided to make some moves in order 
to address the problems that they saw as most damaging to the negotiations.  
 With the threat of failure looming members of the House of Commons sought 
reassurance with David Anderson, the representative of Esquimalt-Saanich, asking 
Minister Sharp a question in the House of Commons, on 21 July 1969.331 Anderson asked 
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the Minister to reassure the government that “as far as Canada is concerned there will be 
no breakdown of these talks over the question of the so-called two China’s.” In response 
to Anderson’s question, Minister Sharp stated that “We are not promoting either a two-
China policy or a one-China, one Taiwan policy. Our policy is to recognize one 
government of China.”332 Sharp went on to state that the government felt that it would be 
inappropriate for Canada to endorse the “position of the People’s Republic of China on 
the extent of its territorial sovereignty,” since Canada had not asked the PRC to endorse 
Canada’s territorial limits. 333 Sharp felt that requiring a foreign power, such as the PRC, 
to endorse the territorial limits of Canada would cast doubts about the extent of Canada’s 
sovereignty, by extension it would also be inappropriate for either side to challenge the 
territorial limits of the other.334  Sharp was also asked by the Conservative Leader of the 
Opposition, Robert L. Stanfield, if the Canadian government would be withdrawing from 
diplomatic relations with the Taiwan government if Canada was successful in achieving 
relations with the PRC. Sharp replied, “Since the government of the People’s Republic of 
China claims to be the only government of China, obviously we cannot recognize two 
governments.”335 
 Sharp’s comments were not the only action that the government took to try and 
jump-start the negotiation process. The government also decided to replaced Arthur 
Andrew with Margaret Meagher, an “experienced career diplomat and skilled 
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negotiator.”336 Meagher was a distinguished Canadian diplomat who had a history of 
achieving what no Canadian woman had before her.  In 1958 she became the first female 
Canadian diplomat to become an ambassador when she was appointed the Canadian 
Ambassador to Israel.337 When she was sent to Tel Aviv she also became the first woman 
head of mission an honour that she would repeat on future postings to Vienna, Kenya and 
Uganda, and Cyprus. Meagher’s assignment to the negotiations between Canada and the 
PRC would be the high point in her career as a Canadian diplomat as she was given the 
task of leading the Canadian team in negotiations.338 
 When the two sides met for the seventh time, the focus of their attention was 
directed towards how they would announce that an agreement had been reached, should 
they reach one.339 It was during this meeting that Canada’s efforts to improve the 
prospect of successful negotiations paid off.  The Chinese representatives had taken note 
of the comments that Sharp made in the House of Commons, and seemed satisfied with 
the explanation that he had given for why Canada was unwilling to endorse the limits of 
the PRC’s territory.340 At the same meeting the Canadian negotiators expressed their 
desire that the announcement should take the form of a simple communication 
announcing that the two sides had reached an agreement to open relations with one 
another.   
 The next meeting took place on 18 October 1969, and the PRC came forward with 
a draft communication to use, should an agreement be reached; however, the Canadian 
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negotiators had some issues with the draft that the PRC had put forward. The main issue 
that the Canadian side had with the draft was that it gave the impression that the 
Canadian government supported the PRC’s position more than it actually did. The 
statement was made up of three paragraphs and the one dealing with Taiwan talked about 
Taiwan being an “inalienable part of the territory of the PRC.”341 Canada would “respect” 
this policy by not pursuing any “two-Chinas,” or “one-China, one-Taiwan” policies and 
severing all ties to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Though draft communication was clearly 
an attempt on the part of the PRC at compromise it was still unacceptable. Canada 
communicated to the PRC that it could not accept the draft at the next meeting, held on 
24 October.342 Both sides would spend many months, until August 1970, either holding 
meetings of no consequence or doing work behind the scenes attempting to find some 
arrangement that both sides would find acceptable. 
  When both sides met for the fifteenth time, on 1 August 1970, they agreed on the 
wording for the first and third paragraphs of the communication, but the second 
paragraph that addressed the issue of Taiwan was still a source of friction between the 
two sides.343  While Canadian officials had hoped to avoid the issue of Taiwan during the 
negotiations, there had always been concern that it would be raised by the PRC.  In 1968, 
J. Blair Seaborn, working for the Far Eastern Division, put forward a proposal for how to 
deal with the issue of Taiwan, should the attempts by the government to open 
negotiations prove to be successful.344  
                                                
341 Ibid., 206. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid., 209. 
344 LAC, RG 25 vol. 10089 file 20-1-2-China-1 vol. 4, “China: Possible Canadian 
Recognition”, 21 October 1968, 1. 
 124 
 Seaborn was specifically worried about a maneuver that the PRC had employed 
when negotiating recognition with the French government in 1963. In that instance the 
PRC had not raised the issue of Taiwan until after it had been announced that an 
agreement had been reached, and France would recognize the PRC as the official 
government of China.345 In France’s case the only two options would be for France to 
either break off relations with Taiwan, or allow the recognition agreement to fall apart, 
which would be a source of significant embarrassment for the government.346 To avoid 
being put in the same situation, Seaborn knew that a solution to the Taiwan problem 
would have to be reached before the negotiations were over. He put forward a statement 
that he felt would help solve the problem. Part of the statement included: “We recognize 
the Peking government as the only government of China, without necessarily accepting 
its territorial claims over areas in which it does not now exercise jurisdiction.”347 Though 
Seaborn’s statement would have been rejected by the PRC, it was similar to the proposed 
statement that eventually solved the issue two years later. 
 The Taiwan issue would remain unresolved until a meeting on 3 October 1970, 
when the PRC agreed to a Canadian proposal.348 To settle the issue of Taiwan in the 
negotiations, Canada proposed that the paragraph addressing the issue of Taiwan be 
worded in such a way that both sides could walk away from the negotiations feeling that 
their requirements had been addressed. The paragraph stated that: 
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 The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the 
 territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note 
 of this position of the Chinese Government.349 
 
The paragraph acknowledged that the PRC claimed ownership of Taiwan and while 
Canada did take note of its position, it stopped short of saying that Canada actually 
approved or disapproved of Peking’s claim. The statement proposed by Canadian 
officials appeared to be enough to satisfy both parties, as the Canadian side proposed it, 
and it was accepted by the PRC.  
 In a statement made to the House of Commons on 13 October 1970, Mitchell 
Sharp informed the House that negotiations between the two sides had been completed. 
Sharp read the joint communiqué that would be announced by both Canada and the PRC, 
identifying the four main parts of the agreement, the second point being the statement of 
Canada taking note of the PRC’s position regarding Taiwan.350 The third point stated 
“The Canadian government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China 
as the sole legal government of China.”351  
 When questioned by the Leader of the Opposition, Stanfield, about Canada’s 
relations with the ROC, Sharp admitted that both governments were in the process of 
terminating relations with one another. Sharp stated that “Both Peking and Taipeh assert 
that it is not possible to recognize simultaneously more than one government of China,” 
which resulted in Canada and the ROC terminating relations as Canada now recognized 
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the PRC as the official government of China352 As a result the ROC Ambassador to 
Canada, Yu-Chi Hsueh, left Canada for the United States shortly before the 
announcement confirming recognition of the PRC was made.353  
 Hsueh made his displeasure about the situation very clear before he left Canada. 
One of the statements that he was reported to have made was that “Canadians should be 
‘very much concerned’ because the Chinese Communists support terrorists who want to 
form ‘what they want to call the people’s republic of Canada.’”354 The ending of relations 
between the ROC and Canada had been expected, as the ROC had taken the same action 
when the French government had recognized the PRC.355  The French government 
informed the ROC, on 10 February 1964, that they would be recognizing the PRC as the 
official government of China, and they were also prepared to sever all ties to the ROC.356 
When the ROC was informed of France’s actions they chose to act first and “issued a 
statement the same day that it was severing relations with France.”357  
 The Canadian government had expected the actions of the ROC. In practical 
terms, the PRC had much more potential to offer the Canadian government than did 
Taiwan. The amount of capital brought into the Canadian economy from exporting to 
Taiwan for the first half of 1968 was 8.1 million dollars with wheat sales accounting for 
1.8 million dollars.358 The non-wheat Canadian exports to Taiwan totaled 6.3 million 
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dollars, which was approximately three times the amount made by Canada selling non-
wheat goods to the PRC.359  Taiwan had the advantage in non-wheat sales, but it was 
heavily offset by the fact that the PRC was purchasing large amounts of wheat from 
Canada, providing more than a hundred million dollars for the Canadian economy.  
 By 1969 trade between Canada and the PRC was heavily in Canada’s favour, with 
Canada exporting 122.4 million dollars in goods to China and the PRC exporting 27.4 
million dollars in goods to Canada.360 Of the 122.4 million dollars that Canada exported 
to China over 95% of the trade was the result of Canadian grain being sold to Mainland 
China.361 While the sale of grain did provide large injections of money into the Canadian 
economy, the actual amount of grain sold on an annual basis varied greatly, making it 
difficult to predict what future sales of grain would look like.362 The exporting of grain to 
China was inconsistent, but the exporting of non-grain products to China was consistent 
though not in a positive way. Canada’s non-grain exports to the PRC amounted to 
approximately 4.9 million dollars and had made no advances for the period of 1961-
1969.363 By contrast during this time period the PRC’s exports to Canada increased 
ninefold.364 
 The difference in trade revenue and the value involved showed that the PRC had 
far more economic power and potential than the ROC, which only controlled Taiwan. 
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The amount of trade being done with the PRC more than justified any loss of trade that 
would result from the severing of relations between Canada and Taiwan.  While a loss of 
some trade between the two governments was possible and Canada wanted to maintain 
the appearance that its severance of ties to Taiwan was total, the truth was that Canada 
did not intend to sever all contact with Taiwan. The Canadian government intended to 
treat Taiwan much as it had treated the PRC prior to recognizing it as the official 
government of China, which entailed the maintaining of unofficial relations between the 
two governments.365  
 Canada had kept the United States informed of the state of the negotiations 
between Canada and the PRC, and the announcement that an agreement had been reached 
came as “no surprise in higher diplomatic circles around the world.”366  While the United 
States did not object to Canada’s actions, it was still not fully in favour of them either. 
After the announcement of recognition, the State Department responded that it was 
concerned that “the Ottawa-Peking agreement would have adverse effects on the 
international position of Nationalist China.”367 In a meeting between the United States 
President, Richard Nixon, the assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
Henry Kissinger, and the Vice President of the ROC, C. K. Yen, the issue of Canadian 
recognition of the PRC was raised. Nixon stated that Canada’s actions “had disturbed 
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some people” and he felt that Canada’s actions were “strictly political.”368 Officials in 
Washington were not so much concerned with seeking retribution against Canada as they 
were to assure their allies that the United States was not following in the steps of Canada. 
Nixon himself stated that some people had come to believe that Canada’s actions were a 
“harbinger of what the United States would do.”369 After Canada’s recognition of the 
PRC was complete, the ROC sought assurances from the United States that they would 
not follow suit with Canada. Nixon assured the ROC that the “U.S. position remained the 
same” and that the United States would “maintain our vote in the U.N. on the traditional 
pattern.”370 The lack of response from the United States highlighted that it had come to 
terms with Canada’s decision and while it may not have been happy with the decision, 
there would be no real fallout that would hurt relations between the two countries. 
  The actions taken by the Canadian government represented the culmination of 
more than two decades of work. Since 1949, when the Communist government was 
installed on mainland China, Canadian officials had been trying to find a way to 
recognize the PRC as the official government of China and now they finally had. The 
determination of the Canadian government can be seen as it continued to try to find new 
ways to recognize the PRC as the official government of China, both in the years between 
1949 and 1970 and in the twenty months that negotiations were taking place between the 
two sides. Prime Minister Trudeau saw the PRC as a means of furthering Canadian 
security and remained determined to open relations with that government, never giving 
up and also trying new ideas to find a method of success. 
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The Relationship Grows, 1970-1971 
 
 Canada recognizing the PRC as the official government of China was a 
momentous event in Canadian foreign policy; however, it was only the first half of the 
opening of relations between the two countries. The second half involved the exchanging 
of Ambassadors. When Sharp had read the joint communiqué between Canada and the 
PRC regarding recognition, to the House of Commons the fourth point stated “The 
Canadian and Chinese governments have agreed to exchange ambassadors within six 
months.”371 The appointment of Ambassadors and the opening of embassies between the 
two countries would be a significant move forward for relations between the two 
governments. The DEA was not the only department that found value in the opening of 
an embassy in Mainland China.  
 After the issue of recognition had been resolved, but before the embassies had 
been opened, and were still in the development phase, there were plans for another 
department to have a strong presence within the embassy in Peking. The other department 
that would have a significant presence in the embassy was the Department of Commerce, 
Trade, and Industry.372 The government considered the Department of Commerce, Trade, 
and Industry to be of particular importance to the Canadian presence in China. The 
government did not expect that the opening of an embassy would cause a sudden increase 
in the amount of trade that was conducted, but the government did want to make an effort 
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to see “a steady and healthy growth in Canadian exports to China.”373 The main reason 
that Ottawa wanted the Department of Commerce, Trade, and Industry to have a strong 
presence in the embassy was that it would give the Department representatives easy 
access to the Chinese trading corporations. It would also put the Department 
representatives in “the best possible position to advise Canadian businessmen of any 
potential markets that may exist for their products.”374  
 The establishing of the Canadian embassy in Beijing was a relatively smooth 
affair. The survey team that was sent ahead to lay the groundwork for establishment of 
the embassy reported that the Chinese authorities with whom they interacted during their 
mission were “generally very co-operative.”375 The survey team had reported some 
problems; however, they did not stop the government from moving forward with their 
plans to open the embassy, which was done on 1 February 1971.376 Though the opening 
of the embassy was complete, some of the problems that the survey team reported still 
remained. At the time of the opening the staff of the embassy included about a dozen 
employees and their families; however, many of them had to stay in the Hsin Chiao 
Hotel, since there were not enough apartments available for them.377 The survey team had 
requested nineteen apartments, but he Chinese government was only able to provide five 
for the embassy staff and their families.378  
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 The lack of housing is something that would be important to Canada, as the 
government intended to expand the total number of embassy staff. The government 
intended the embassy to have six officers, an Ambassador, two political men, two trade 
men and an administrative officer.379 Additional personnel who would be required to 
maintain the building, facilitate communication between Chinese and Canadian officials, 
as well as doing the minor work needed to keep the embassy running would bring the 
total number of personnel working at the embassy to thirty-six people.380 Ralph Collins 
had been selected to serve as the Canadian Ambassador to the PRC even before the 
negotiations in Stockholm had been completed.381 Collins had grown up in a missionary 
compound being operated by Canadian missionaries in Mainland China before the 
Communist forces had taken control of the country.382 His appointment was made official 
on 8 April 1971 when Cabinet approved his position as Ambassador to the PRC.383 
 At the same time that Canada was opening its embassy in Peking, the PRC was 
opening its embassy in Ottawa. Just as there had been some problems with Canada 
establishing its embassy in Peking, mainly to do with housing for the staff and their 
families, there were also problems for the PRC establishing their embassy in Ottawa. The 
main problem that threatened the opening of the PRC’s embassy was that the property 
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that would become the embassy was currently in the hands of the old Chinese 
government.384 
 The ROC had an embassy in Ottawa as well as a full diplomatic presence, and the 
issue of how the ROC may be removed from Canada was a question that the Canadian 
government faced. When the French government had chosen to recognize the PRC as the 
official government of China, the ROC refused to leave France, which proved to be a 
source of great embarrassment to the French government.385  As Canada was taking part 
in the negotiations in Stockholm, government officials were trying to determine the best 
course of action to follow if the ROC began causing problems, though there were not any 
indications that the ROC was planning to do so.  
 If the PRC demanded to have the former ROC embassy for their own use, the 
ROC could have caused the Canadian government a significant amount of embarrassment 
by selling the property of the embassy, as well as their consulate properties, to a friendly 
organization or individual.386 The loss of the property would be a problem for the 
Canadian government because they had come to the conclusion that there was very little 
if anything that they could do to prevent the ROC from selling or giving the property to a 
third party of their choosing. Fortunately, for the Canadian government the ROC decided 
to sell the properties to “a third party” that would lease “the buildings back to the ROC 
for the duration of their official term in Canada.”387 The actions of the ROC provided a 
solution to the problem; however, with the embassy still being used by the ROC staff at 
the time of recognition, it was impossible for the PRC to make use of the building 
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immediately, since the ROC would require time to vacate the building.  The ROC staff 
were given two weeks to “terminate the business” of the embassy and an additional two 
weeks to “complete the withdrawal from Canada of its non-Canadian personnel.”388   
 On the same day that Canada was opening its embassy in Peking, a delegation 
from the PRC arrived in Ottawa to set-up their own embassy.389  The delegation was led 
by Hsu Chung-Fu, who had headed the team that had conducted recognition negotiations 
with Canada in Stockholm. In addition to Hsu, there were ten other members of the 
delegation who were meet in Ottawa by various government officials, including Arthur 
Andrew, who had initially negotiated with the PRC in Stockholm, and was now the 
director of Asian and Pacific affairs for the Department of External Affairs.390  Hsu 
achieved further prominence when he was appointed the Chinese Ambassador to Canada 
in July of that same year.391 Ambassador Hsu was an important official in the opening of 
relations between the PRC and Canada, as he had taken part in the negotiations, the 
establishment of the PRC Embassy in Ottawa, and finally serving as the first Ambassador 
to Canada from the PRC. 
Canada and Chinese Representation at the United Nations  
 After the exchange of Ambassadors between Canada and the PRC was complete, 
Trudeau moved on to the next phase of Canada’s China policy, which was seeing the 
PRC becoming the Chinese representative in the United Nations. The United States had 
surrendered the issue of recognition to Canada, but the issue of representation in the 
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United Nations was a different matter entirely. The only firm condition of the United 
States regarding Canada’s recognition of the PRC, having been communicated to 
Ambassador Ritchie from Secretary of State William Rogers, had been that Canada did 
not recognize the PRC’s claim over Taiwan.392 The United States’ position showed that 
while it was willing to allow its allies to open relations with the PRC, it would not renege 
on its commitment to protect Taiwan’s independence. The United States saw maintaining 
Taiwan’s position as the representative of China in the United Nations as part of that 
commitment. If the PRC were appointed the Chinese representative in the United 
Nations, it would greatly weaken Taiwan’s position in the international community, and 
could potentially lead to Taiwan being placed under the control of the PRC. It was this 
worst-case scenario that caused the United States to use its considerable influence in the 
United Nations to try and block any attempts to seat the PRC. 
 The continual rejection of the Albanian resolution was meant to keep the PRC out 
of the United Nations and keep Taiwan as the Chinese representative; however, support 
for the Albanian resolution had been growing in the years prior to 1969. Canada had 
abstained from voting for the resolution since 1966, but the United States had other 
options for keeping the PRC out of the United Nations, most notably the Important 
Question resolution.  When the issue of the Important Question resolution was raised in 
the United Nations the Canadian delegation voted in favour of the issue.393 The Important 
Question resolution was passed at the twenty-fifth meeting of the General Assembly, on 
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20 November 1970, with a vote of 66-to-52 with 7 abstentions.394 The value of the 
Important Question resolution was shown in the 1970 meeting of the General Assembly. 
It was during this meeting of the General Assembly that the Albanian resolution was 
approved by a vote of 51-to-49, with 25 abstentions; however though a majority had been 
achieved it was not the two-thirds required, which effectively blocked the attempt to seat 
the PRC.395  The 1970 meeting was the first time that the Albanian resolution had been 
approved in a vote of the General Assembly, and Canada had voted in favour of the 
Albanian resolution, adding its voice to those calling for the PRC to take the China seat 
in the United Nations.396 
 The reason for the victory of the Albanian resolution was because the United 
States, the chief opponent of the Albanian resolution, had traditionally relied on a 
“coalition of Western Europeans, Latin Americans, black African, and non-communist 
Asia,” to ensure that the Important Question resolution was passed and Albanian 
resolution was opposed.397 In 1970 however, the coalition began to break apart with the 
United States losing the support of “Western Europe, the Andean LAs, and significant 
support among black Africans” regarding the Albanian resolution.398 The number of 
nations who would oppose the Albanian resolution in the United Nations would continue 
to decline, partly as a result of Canadian efforts. 
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 Canada had succeeded in its attempts to recognize the PRC without recognizing 
the PRC’s claim to Taiwan by using the “take note of” formula that Canadian officials 
had developed. Canada was the first to use the strategy, but it would not be the last. After 
the success that Canada had experienced with its formula, other nations employed the 
formula resulting in a wave of recognition agreements between the PRC and various 
other nations of the world.399 The wave of recognition made possible by the Canadian 
formula resulted in increasing support for the Albanian resolution and forced the United 
States to explore new strategies to ensure Taiwan remained in the United Nations. 
  By 1971 Canada’s position on the Albanian resolution had been made clear, but 
the United States was still determined to ensure that the PRC was not seated in the United 
Nations. The United States government began contacting it allies in the United Nations 
trying to shore up support for the Important Question resolution and consequently put 
pressure on Canada to support it. In a telegram sent from the United States Department of 
State to the Mission to NATO, Canada was identified as one of the members of NATO 
who would be voting for the Albanian resolution and against the Important Question 
resolution.400 Washington was aware that there was little possibility of swaying Canada, 
among other nations, to the side of the United States so Washington officials decided to 
focus their attention on ensuring that the Important Question resolution would be given 
priority over the Albanian resolution.401 Canadian officials had made their position on the 
issue clear, but the United States still believed that there was a “small chance that 
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pressure will induce abstentions on IQ as well” to achieve their goal they continued to 
raise the issue in Ottawa until the vote was held.402 
 With the balance of power in the United Nations shifting away from the ROC 
towards the PRC, the United States began looking to develop support for a resolution that 
it had worked hard to defeat five years earlier. The United States came to decide that the 
only way to ensure that the ROC would be able to maintain a presence in the United 
Nations was to have “Dual Representation” of China in the United Nations. One of the 
biggest problems that the United States would face was convincing the ROC to support 
the notion of dual representation, something that the United States would spend July and 
August of 1971 trying to achieve.403 In a meeting, that took place in late July 1971 
between Secretary of State Rogers and diplomats from the ROC, Rogers stated that the: 
 Only chance of preserving membership of ROC in UN is for US to support a 
 resolution which would provide representation for your government and 
 government of Peking and at least to acquiesce in majority view that government 
 in Peking should hold seat on SC.404 
 
 The plan that the United States was proposing was essentially identical to the 
proposal that Paul Martin had advocated in 1966 with both the ROC and the PRC being 
represented in the United Nations General Assembly and the PRC being given China’s 
spot on the Security Council. Martin had foreseen that the tide was turning in favour of 
the PRC and had tried to devise a solution to keep the ROC in the United Nations, only to 
have the United States oppose his plan and see that it failed to make it before the 
Assembly. Now the situation that Martin had warned about was occurring with the PRC 
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making it into the United Nations at the expense of the ROC and the United States was 
trying one last attempt to keep the ROC in the organization. 
 The United States had accepted the fact that it would not be able to keep the PRC 
out of the United Nations and was simply looking to minimize the damage by trying to 
keep the ROC in the General Assembly. In a memorandum from Secretary of State 
Rogers to President Nixon, Rogers expresses his belief that if the United States could get 
enough votes to see the Important Question resolution passed, and by extension block the 
Albanian resolution, then they would be able to get the needed votes to have the Dual 
Representation resolution passed.405 If the Important Question resolution failed then the 
Albanian resolution would likely succeed and the PRC would become the representative 
of China with the ROC losing its status in the General Assembly.406 With officials in 
Washington viewing the Dual Representation resolution as being their best chance to see 
the ROC remain in the United Nations, it becomes clear that the United States had come 
to accept that that they could not keep the PRC out of the United Nations and were now 
working on damage control.  
 The day of the vote for the Important Question and Albanian resolutions, 25 
October 1971, it was reported that the United States believed that it would have the votes 
needed to maintain the Important Question resolution that required a two-thirds majority. 
A spokesman for the United States delegation to the United Nations stated that “we think 
we’re going to win that vote.”407  An unnamed diplomat who was friendly to the United 
States had come to the conclusion that the United States had “a 58-to-57 or 59-to-57 
                                                
405 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, 12 
October 1971, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, 829. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Unknown, “Crucial Vote Nears”, Winnipeg Free Press, 25 October 1971, 1. 
 140 
advantage with more favorable votes possible.”408  The optimism that the United States 
expressed prior to the vote can either be attributed to wishful thinking, or an attempt by 
the delegation to downplay the reality of the situation.  
 When the vote regarding the Important Question was held those who supported 
the entrance of the PRC into the United Nations won the vote with 59 nations voting 
against it, 55 for it, and 15 nations abstaining from the vote.409 The vote on the Albanian 
resolution took place at the same meeting after the defeat of the Important Question 
resolution. The vote for the Albanian resolution was 76 voting in favour of the motion, 35 
voting against it, and 17 nations abstaining from the vote.410 The Dual Representation 
resolution was scheduled to be put to a vote on 26 October, the day after the Albanian 
resolution, but given that the Albanian resolution was approved, the Assembly decided 
not to consider the Dual Representation resolution since the issue had been resolved.411 
 George Bush, the United States’ Ambassador to the United Nations, blamed the 
defection of several countries that he had received assurances of support from for the 
defeat of the Important Question resolution and the success of the Albanian resolution.412  
Among the nations that had chosen to vote in favour of seating the PRC were France, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, the remaining three members of the United 
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Nations Security Council.413 Canada was also among the nations that had chosen to vote 
to give the China seat in the United Nations to the PRC.414 In explaining his reasoning for 
why Canada had voted the way that it had, External Affairs Minister Sharp stated that in 
a technical sense Taiwan had not been expelled because “there is no government of 
Taiwan as far as I am aware.”415 Sharp’s position was that Taiwan had never been a 
member of the United Nations; the issue had always been about who would represent 
China in the international organization and with the PRC controlling Mainland China, the 
answer should be obvious.416  
 After the PRC had been seated in the United Nations, Chester Ronning, a former 
Canadian Ambassador to China, was quick to credit Canada as being an important player 
in seating the PRC.  In his words “Canada started the trend and, as a result, the People’s 
Republic of China is seated in the United Nations today.”417 Ronning’s reasoning was 
that Canada’s decision to recognize the PRC “made it decent for the people of the United 
States to talk about China and admitting the nation to the U.N.” 418  
 Canada was not a major political player in the United Nations, but its influence 
can be seen on both sides of the debate. Canada had remained firmly on the side of the 
PRC during 1971 meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, making it clear that 
it would vote for the Albanian resolution as it had the previous year to the point that the 
United States did not think that it was possible to sway Canada’s position. Canada’s 
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formula to allow it to recognize the PRC as the official government of China was utilized 
by other nations that helped to further shift the balance of power in favour of the PRC, to 
the point that “So many countries now recognized the Communist government of China 
that simple mathematics mandated the change.”419 On the opposite side, the Dual 
Representation resolution, a last ditch effort on the part of the United States to ensure that 
the ROC would remain within the United Nations, was essentially a mirror image of the 
resolution that Paul Martin had attempted to introduce in 1966. The United States had 
originally opposed Martin’s proposal, but when the situation that Martin had hoped to 
avoid came to pass the United States would create a plan identical to Martin’s, and 
perhaps even based off Martin’s plan. 
 The decision on the part of Canada to vote in favour of the PRC entering the 
United Nations can be seen as the culmination of several Canadian objectives. Among 
these objectives was the strengthening of the international community by bringing the 
PRC out of isolation, helping to maintain good relations with the PRC, and highlighting 
the independence of Canadian foreign policy from the foreign policy of the United States. 
Conclusion 
 
 The importance of Prime Minister Trudeau’s first term in office to the 
development of Canada-China relations cannot be over-stated. It was during Trudeau’s 
first term that Canada formally recognized the PRC as the official government of China, 
the two governments established embassies and exchanged Ambassadors with one 
another, and the PRC entered into the United Nations as the representative of the Chinese 
nation. While it is true that the success of Canadian foreign policy relating to these events 
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can be partially attributed to the softening of the United States’ stance regarding 
Canadian recognition of the PRC, it is also important to remember the contributions that 
Canadian officials made to the process.  
 The determination of Canadian officials to see Canada recognize the PRC and 
bring that government out of isolation contributed to maintaining the momentum required 
to proceed with recognition. For Trudeau, nothing but good things could come from 
having closer ties to the PRC. He was a man who admired the PRC and felt contempt for 
the ROC in Taiwan, who believed that the best way to ensure Canadian security was to 
strengthen the international community, and who maintained that Canada’s weakness 
required it to remain on good terms with those who were strong. Finally, the actions of 
the Canadian government changed the landscape of the international community by 
indirectly providing the support needed to see the Albanian resolution passed in the 
United Nations General Assembly. The first three years of the Trudeau government 
marked the end of a twenty-two year quest to recognize one of the largest, most 
populated countries in the world, and bring it out of isolation.  
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Conclusion 
The Practicality of Canada’s Policy towards China 
 
 The recognition of Communist China proved to be a major policy consideration 
within Canadian government circles between 1949 and 1971 and consistently engaged 
the attention of successive prime ministers and senior Cabinet members.  Canada’s 
relations with Beijing in this period developed neither in a linear nor a uniform fashion, 
and Ottawa frequently experienced considerable difficulty articulating a coherent China 
policy.  But in the long run, slow and halting progress was towards the ultimate 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and by the end of 1971 Canada joined the 
ranks of an increasing number of Western nations who rejected their former Cold War 
positions aimed at isolating Communist China in favour of embracing Beijing in the 
diplomatic – if not the ideological – arena. 
 The efforts of the Canadian government to recognize the PRC and abandon the 
Taiwanese claim as the diplomatic voice of China were heavily influenced by the 
prevailing East-West conflict in the early decades of the Cold War.  Indeed, 
Washington’s vigorous attempts to isolate Beijing proved to be the single consistent 
factor impacting Canada’s policies towards Communist China.  Perhaps more than any 
other country in the Western alliance, Canada proved susceptible to the authority and 
weight of American presidential administrations because of the intimate economic, 
geographic, and political connections between Washington and Ottawa.  Nonetheless, 
successive Canadian prime ministers adopted an increasingly pragmatic position 
regarding the status of China within the general framework of Cold War diplomacy.  This 
practical orientation of Canadian policymakers stands out as the key feature of the 
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recognition debate and highlights Ottawa’s flexible and self-interested approach that was 
not guided primarily by moral or ideological factors. 
 For Louis St. Laurent’s Liberal government, any thoughts of recognizing Mao 
Zedong’s fledgling mainland government in the aftermath of China’s civil war were 
discarded as a result of the Korean War.  With Canadian troops fighting on the Korean 
peninsula against Chinese forces, St. Laurent willingly followed America’s lead in 
adopting a vigorous anti-China policy and fully endorsed the intensive program of 
economic sanctions embodied in the China differential.  With no economic motivations 
involved, Ottawa chose the practical and obvious course of action and looked to protect 
both its security interests and its bilateral relationship with the United States.  Although 
the Department of External Affairs regularly reviewed the question of Canada’s position 
towards China in the United Nations, St. Laurent and Lester Pearson acquiesced to 
American demands to keep Taiwan in the Chinese seat in the General Assembly.  Since 
most members of the Western alliance refused to challenge Washington’s leadership in 
the United Nations in the 1950s, Canada’s position in this matter rested on simple 
political and diplomatic expediency. 
 John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government proved resolute in its 
desire to buttress its anti-communist credentials in the international political sphere, and 
no significant initiatives were launched by Ottawa to extend full diplomatic recognition 
to Beijing or allow the Communist Chinese government to secure a seat in the United 
Nations.  But Diefenbaker willingly confronted Washington to strongly assert its 
independence in fostering trade links with the Chinese government when practical 
domestic concerns developed about the sluggish Canadian economy and the desire to 
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buttress Progressive Conservative support in Western Canada by selling surplus Canadian 
wheat.  Initial steps to sell wheat to China were halting and proceeded with the general 
cooperation of the Eisenhower Administration, which relaxed extraterritorial regulations 
to permit Canadian subsidiaries of American corporations to be involved in small trade 
deals with China.  Emboldened by these concessions, the Diefenbaker government 
aggressively negotiated significant wheat sales to Beijing and steadfastly resisted 
pressure from the Kennedy Administration to maintain some semblance of a 
comprehensive American-Canadian trade embargo against China. 
 During his tenure as prime minister, Lester Pearson made concerted attempts to 
transform Canadian policy towards Communist China.  He expanded Canada’s trade with 
China and expressed a general openness to extending formal diplomatic recognition to 
Beijing or, alternatively, to come to some arrangement to seat Communist China in the 
United Nations.  Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin also attempted to 
wield considerable influence in pushing Canada towards a more progressive position 
concerning China, in marked contrast to his External Affairs predecessors who tended to 
avoid advocated strong positions within Cabinet on the issue.  But the practical realities 
of the international situation in the mid-1960s blunted the efforts of Pearson and Martin.  
Internal political and social turmoil in China rendered immediate recognition of China 
impossible in the view of leading Liberal politicians.  Furthermore, one of the final 
concerted attempts of the United States to wield its influence in the United Nations on the 
issue of Chinese representation denied Communist China a General Assembly seat and 
convinced Pearson that the drawbacks of alienating Washington outweighed the potential 
benefits of finally allowing Beijing into the United Nations. 
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 It would fall to Pierre Trudeau, therefore, to finally settle the issue of the 
diplomatic recognition of Communist China by Canada and to fully support efforts to 
seat Beijing in the United Nations.  Trudeau’s longstanding sympathy with the efforts of 
mainland China to become a full-fledged member of the international community 
certainly eased the decision of the Canadian government to pursue the establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations; the restoration of order in China after the worst excesses of 
the Cultural Revolution also enabled negotiations between Ottawa and Beijing to proceed 
cautiously in a productive direction.  Additionally, the fierce twenty-year American 
campaign of opposition to any efforts to rehabilitate China into the world system had 
begun to dissipate, and the United States could only fight a rearguard action in its protest 
of Canada’s decision to recognize the PRC and its effort to mount one final crusade to 
keep Communist China from claiming a place in the General Assembly in 1971.  
Ultimately, Trudeau can claim much of the credit for the successful conclusion of the 
contentious debate about normalizing Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations, although a 
rapidly changing international climate in the late-1960s and early-1970s certainly eased 
the difficulties formerly associated with policies recognizing Beijing. 
 A comprehensive overview of Canada’s relations with China between 1949 and 
1971 is an important addition to the existing historiography examining this topic.  By 
definition, it enhances traditional overview accounts of Canadian postwar Canadian 
foreign policy by providing detailed analysis of the motivations of successive 
governments concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing and the 
seating of Communist China in the United Nations.  Furthermore, the examination of 
Canadian policy in the longer term moves the focus away from studies examining 
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individual prime ministers – Pierre Trudeau in particular – to place the gradual 
development of a coherent Canadian policy towards China in a proper historical context 
that emphasizes the contributions of successive Ottawa governments.  The importance of 
economic matters in the formation of Canadian strategy beyond the wheat deals 
negotiated by the Diefenbaker government is also highlighted, as the desire to expand 
trade and develop business contacts between Ottawa and Beijing certainly influenced 
Canada’s tactics regarding China since the end of the Korean War.  Finally, examining all 
factors influencing policy makers in Ottawa can properly identify the role of the United 
States in the emerging Sino-Canadian relationship.  To be certain, Washington exerted an 
important influence, but existing studies focusing exclusively on the impact of Canadian-
American relations on the China question ignore many other political, economic, and 
diplomatic factors impacting the practical motivations of the St. Laurent, Diefenbaker, 
Pearson, and Trudeau governments. 
 In sum, therefore, the critical events that marked the development of Canadian 
policy towards the People’s Republic of China before 1971 set the stage for the 
remarkable enlargement of relations between the two countries down to the present day.  
Pierre Trudeau became the first Canadian prime minister to officially visit China in 1973, 
and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang conducted a state visit to Canada in 1984.  In the latter 
year, the Canadian government established the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada to 
enhance Canada’s knowledge and understanding of the transpacific region, with China 
featuring prominently in Foundation affairs.  Since the 1980s, questions of politics, 
diplomacy, and human rights have been almost entirely eclipsed by the dramatic increase 
in trade between Canada and China.  Prime Minister Jean Chretien led four high-profile 
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“Team Canada” trade missions to China between 1994 and 2001, and Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper has expanded Canada’s efforts to promote trade between Ottawa and 
Beijing.  Visiting China in February 2012, Harper signaled Canada’s assent to the 
Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement, a comprehensive pact eighteen 
years in the making formally signed in September 2012 that opens the way to a full-
fledged free trade agreement in the near future – an extraordinary possibility that 
originates in the complex series of historical events leading to the establishment of formal 
diplomatic ties between Canada and China in 1970. 
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